A
Phenomenology OF Discrimination That Appears To be BAsed on The Meaning we
Ascribe to Skin Colour
by
Vernon De Maynard, A.K.C, BA(Hons.), BSc(Hons.), pgDipCouns&Psycho
Table
of Contents
Abstract
Introduction:
1) Phenomenology as a Method of Research
2) A Problem of Empiricism, or Just Badly Done Science?
The
Movement Towards Social Exclusion:
1) Ancient Historical Views on Oppression
2) Is Social Exclusion, inevitable?
The
Relationship Between Dissociation, And Black Men’s Sense Of Identity:
1) On The Question Of Perception:
2) A Historical Basis for Commonly Held Beliefs About Skin Colour
3) Deliberation On The Point Of ‘Difference’
4) Is Such Dissociation Indicative of Health or Illness?
5) The Importance of ‘Skin Colour’ As A Defining Feature
Possible
Consequences of Dissociation Within The Therapeutic Relationship Formed During
Counselling And Psychotherapy: Some Implications
Possible Reasons For The Exclusion of Black Men From Counselling And Psychotherapy
The Importance Of
Language
Emotional
Distress As A Consequence Of ‘Poor’ Problem - solving Abilities
Analogical Reasoning,
and Problem-solving
How Problems Might Be
Mentally-Represented
The ACT* Model Of Learning Problem-solving
Induction versus Deduction
An Experiential/Existential Approach to Elucidate Meaning
Conclusion
References
List of figures
Number Page
Acknowledgments:
The author wishes to thank
Glossary Of Terms:
Black - reflects skin colour as determined by the client
‘Race’ - neologism that reflects attempts to categorise individuals/groups based on biological determinants such as skin colour, physical features, and in some cases, language
Racism – consists of conduct, words, or practices which advantage or disadvantage people because of their skin colour, culture, ethnic origin, and may be subtle or overt.
Institutional Racism – consists of collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate, and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, and/or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.
Culture - set of social values/beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour which seem to be characteristic of a particular group of people, and which show intergenerational stability, overtime
Ethnicity - a group that seems to adhere to a distinct sociocultural, customs, way of life, and/or religious features, in comparison with the wider society in which this group chooses to live
Dissociation - apparent ‘separating-out’ of some aspect of our being that holds negative meanings for us in-relation to others
Abstract:
The
concept of “social exclusion” may be
used to describe the experiences of those people who feel that they do not
belong to mainstream society. This sense of belonging may be considered to be
important within any social grouping as it seems to provide the means by which
individual affirm and confirm each other in positive ways Buber (1966)
describes ways of being which seem to important in the development of this
sense of belonging; of being-there or ‘Da-sein’ in-relation with others. By
application it could be argued that being-there as a. Black man in-relation to
those who perceive themselves as being ‘Not-Black’ within any given society
would require two movements. The first being one where the Black man is set a
part as being ‘different’, and not-White, and the second where the Black man is
made ‘independent’ in spite of this difference through the process of genuine
dialogue. The two need not presuppose the existence of the other, nor present
as prerequisite for the existence of the other, but they must both be present
according to Buber.
The experience of social exclusion
seems to present a situation within which a person or group of people is set
apart but they are not made independent through the process of genuine
dialogue. Much seems to take place that remains unsaid, and based on what is
said, and the inferences derived from what is sensed, seem to bare little truth
in-relation to the object of the individual’s/groups attention. that ‘sets people a part without making them
independent’ (Buber, 1966). We selectively respond to those who present with
particular defining features without evaluating the possibility that the
values, and other sedimentations, that underpin such behaviour may not be valid
within the context in which that we find ourselves.
Discrimination against Black men
‘separates out’ people of a particular colour and gende, without making them
independent and is a ‘social phenomenon’ of importance, historically. For
centuries, the Western world appears to have viewed Black men more for their
‘functional’ value, as opposed to their more ‘aesthetic’ value. This seemed to
pose little problem early on in human history, however, inter-racial dialogue
today continues to be restricted to the sphere of work, and employment.
Divergence of inter-racial dialogue into other social sub-dimensions such as
school, marriage, and the family, has furthered the movement toward greater
inter-racial intersubjectivity by the sharing of cultural information. However,
with advances in technology, and the demise of the manufacturing industries
since the 1970’s, and amidst greater competition for fewer jobs, the non-Black
people of the dominant culture within the Western world have begun to even
question the Black Man’s functional value in-relation to themselves.
It could be argued that ‘social
exclusion’ is more of a consequence, rather than the purpose, of
discrimination, in general. But it might be better argued that if, our actions
in the world are more often than not intentional, then discriminatory behaviour
that results in the experience of what could be described as ‘social exclusion’
must also be considered to be intentional; if, not purposeful. Shedding some
light on this phenomenon may elucidate reasons for its continuance, overtime,
and throw-up ways of helping people of colour construct a sense of identity
that does not appear to be distorted by de-valuing statements about their
character that do not appear not grounded in ‘evidence’.
Phenomenology as a Method of Research
The term phenomenology may be defined as the study of appearances. It is a method research which aims to discover how things appears to the researcher/observer. Husserl (1923) suggested that phenomenology starts with what appears, what is sensed, and ends with verbalised thought, (e.g. naming , and categorisation) of what appears to establish relations between meaning within given contexts. The aim is to establish the pre-requisites for any lived experience to occur. This in-itself seems to require a priori; some prior knowledge of what goes to make-up an object/subject what it appears to be. (Assuming that the object//subject of our intention is made-up of it’s component parts: that is the object of our intention seems to made up of something). For this to occur, the researcher is required to set aside any presumptions s/he may have in-relation to the object/subject, and to direct his/her embodied consciousness towards the object of his/her intention. In this sense, the directedness of the act of looking seems, purposefully. However, what is discovered remains to be discovered anew. What makes up its component parts, the defining features of the object/subject of the researchers directed attention?
Husserl (1977) suggests that both what is, and is not, ready-to-hand, as a construct of our embodied consciousness is worthy of investigation, and that it is out of this that we are able to derive understanding. This method relies on the accurate description of what is sensed, what appears to us through our diligence and application, before any attempt to manipulate any aspect of what has materialised for us can begin. Hence, scientific investigation can not begin until the researcher has described the object/subject to be manipulated s it appears to him/her at the moment in time and space. This I feel is an important aspect of any investigation. In particular, what is a skin colour, how does it reveal itself to us, and how do we establish relations between the meanings of what is revealed within a given context, and what is revealed as consequence of the intersubjective? The method can be outline as follows taken from:
Step 1. The psychological
epoche, requires that we set aside any prior judgements as to what
the object/subject of our intention may be until the said has revealed itself
to us. We remain in the world, and involved with others, and the object, but
reflect on our subjective awareness about the object of our intention. We treat
the object as if we had never seen it before, and reflect on our experience of
it as newly discovered.
Step 2. Attempt
to accurately describe the object of your intention as it appears to you. This
does not involve interpretation. Try not to add, subtract, distort, generalise,
theorise, explain, jump to conclusions, nor repeat conventional wisdom about
the object/subject of you intention.
Step 3. Try
to envisage the possibilities of what appears to ascertain what the
object/subject of your intention is, and what it is not. This facilitates to
move towards an eidetic reduction of what has appeared to you on
reflection. By this it seems that the relation between what has been revealed
maybe established on reflection and we are then able to ‘name/categorise’ what
has been revealed against a horizon of what it is not.
Step 4. This
final action involves a transcendental epoche. By this I mean that we
attempt to dissociate what is one’s own everyday beliefs and assumptions about
what might be possible, and hence what goes beyond what appears to be immanent.
This means that the transcendent is disqualified within everyday experience.
This enables the researcher’s findings to be compared with other researcher
experiences of the same object/subject utilising the same method.
(
This method sounds good, insomuch, as the researcher is required to set aside their own prior judgements whether they be immanent or transcendent, and to describe the object/subjection of their intentional discovery as it appears to him/her at a given time and space. But out of what do we create experience that is sense? How do we make sense of our sensations? Of what are the objects/subjects of our intention made-up? How do we discern what these components parts are? It seems to me that after much deliberation and eidetic reduction there would be nothing left, and how do you describe nothing? To illustrate, consider that we are observing the straight-edged object, below:
Fig.1
We note that it has four straight-edges, and four corners, and that the edges seem to be related to each other such that the straight edge and corners form a continuous alignment with each other and are connected. Further, eidetic reduction would result in the de-construction of the object of our intention into its apparent constituent parts, and it would cease to be a straight-edged object connected at its corners in a continuous line. This seems important with respect to the identification of the a person skin colour. Having deconstructed the physicality of the person to a skin colour, against a background that does not seem to part of the same object/subject, the object/subject of our intention has been reduced to an object which has no meaning other than what we choose to attach to it. In itself, the object as skin colour has no other meaning than that – a skin colour. The person enwrapped in this skin colour remains undiscovered until such time as we chose to enter into genuine dialogue with that person; until we enter into the intersubjective.
It seems to me that, just as inanimate objects appear to be made-up of constituent parts, or defining parts, so too, are people. Black men seem to be made up of defining features of which skin colour s only one. In-itself, this skin colour remains meaningless beyond the statement of factual existence for us as individuals. However, invoking the possibilities, (i.e. the transcendent), as to what a person possessing this skin colour could be observed doing beyond the immanent, seems to remain purely that – a figment of our imagination. This leads me to question as to where the information pertaining to the component parts, or defining features, of ‘the Black man’ originate from? From where does these ‘facts’ reveal themselves?
Clearly, the component parts of the straight-edged figure above, is recognised as such because of the discovery of the straight-edges, and their connectedness. Even with out prior knowledge of ‘the straight-edged figure’, we seem to have some idea as to what it means to be straight-edged, and what it means to be connected. Further, eidetic reduction might reveal that the straight-edges are finite in length thus giving the overall shape a composite shape and size - its configuration. Against an horizon of the page on which the object appears to have been constructed appears to give the shape clear boundaries, and we are able to ascertain where the straight-edges begin, and where they end. In the same way, a skin colour seems to reveal the object of its possessor as being a particular shape against a background that seems unrelated to skin colour, itself. The observer ascertains that the skin colour itself means nothing more than its own immanent qualities, but beyond this, their appears to be nothing else to become ‘known’ about the skin colour remains a mystery without invoking the transcendent. The object, (i.e. the skin colour), has definition; we can ascertain that it does not belong to us, and that it belongs to someone in particular. This seems to be the extent of that which seems immanent, and yet we seem to be able to invoke the transcendent, and conjure-up for ourselves the possibilities of what this skin colour is capable of doing. In-self, the skin colour does not appear to be capable of doing anything. We make the movement from the “thing” to the “thing doing”, and this seems to be an important movement.
We must, therefore, put skin colour in its proper place, (i.e. that of symbol), about which we seem to conjure-up for ourselves our own meaning out of a range of possible views and opinions about what this inanimate object may, and may not, be. In-itself it is nothing more than it is; it does nothing: nothing more seems to reveal itself against an horizon that appears to be the world-around.
If, we give this skin colour movement, and direct our attention such that the skin colour appears to be seen doing something, our attention becomes directed towards that which gives this skin colour movement – the person who owns the skin colour. The Skin colour, now, has form, and function, which reveal themselves through our observations. But the person has not yet revealed themselves to us; and yet, in situations where we separate-out the person of colour without making him/her independent, we seem to behave as, if, s/he has been revealed to us a some point in time and place in history. We believe that s/he has presented to us something of themselves about which we wish to distance ourselves in one way or another. Feelings of disgust well up, emotively, and to avoid their persistence over time and place, we attempt to change the range of possible sensations without considering the possibility that our perceptions in that time and place may not be as accurate as we might like them to be (Husserl, 1918/1960).. But this in-itself poses yet another question. Do we wait until the object of our disgust/fear, and perceived threat, becomes precisely that? At what time do we begin to defend ourselves and preserve ourselves in-relation with the perceived threat? Do we wait, and possibly cease to exist for the other? Hw long do we wait and verify our perceptions in-relation before taking defensive steps to avoid annihilation in-relation with others?
In the first
instance, it would seem that assuming such a position in the face of immanent
danger would seem foolhardy. It the recent episodes of what were found to be
racially motivated crimes against Black men, (e.g.
Problem of Empiricism, or Just Badly Done Science?
Within Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Meno’s Paradox seems
to have been; addressed. The great French Existential-Phenomenologist, and
Ontologist, argued that, ‘Empiricism (Science) cannot see that we need to know
what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it; and that,
‘Intellectualism (rationalism) fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what
we are looking for, or equally again, we would not be searching’. However,
I am not entirely convinced that the latter of these two propositions is,
necessarily, the case. This latter statement suggests that the process of
‘looking for something’ does not require the observer to demonstrate
intentionality in the act of looking, in-itself. Further, this latter statement
defies the ‘Verification Principle,’ which states that: ‘a statement is
factual, and hence meaningful, only if sense experience can go at least some
way to confirming it’. Therefore, the intentional act of looking; in either
this way or that, allows for the process to become both factual and meaningful
because sense experience relates the act of our intention, (i.e. looking), with
the object/subject of our intention. Hence, the act of looking becomes not only
intentional, but also, purposeful, (i.e. its becomes meaningful). In addition,
anyone calling into existence an object/subject of his experience must know
under what conditions he calls it ‘true’, and subsequently under what condition
he calls it ‘false’. Failing to say something about the conditions in which the
sense experience is to be validated casts doubt as to whether the sense
experience is known, and knowable; and hence, seems devoid of meaning (
If, I am looking, (i.e. simply staring out into space), I become aware of both, apparently stagnant and moving things, which can be represented, internally, against a background or horizon in which the objects/subjects of my intention are to be found. If, I were ignorant of what I was looking for I would not know that I had found it, rationally, or empirically, as I have not stated what it is that I had been looking for, in the first instance. But the searching in-itself, would not stop me from discovering something new, or different, from what appears to be familiar to my senses; elucidated at the points where what is known to me becomes unclear. I may not know what I have found in the totality of its configuration, but I may know something about its configuration in that what is known seems to give me clues as to what it is that I have perceived in totality, intellectually. In which case, I may be able to ascertain the object/subject of my intention’s true nature, empirically, by applying what I believe to be true about the object/subject of my intention’s component parts. Hence, Descartes instigation of the Mind-Body duality, and the separation of the human person into its components parts to ascertain the human person in its totality seems to be bare witness to the possibility of uncovering the truth about being-there in part; if, not in totality.
Ontologically, I seem to be aware of those objects that have movement, in relation to, and with, my own lived-body, much more so, than those objects which do not appear to move at all. I may not be looking for anything, in particular; but I recognise some aspects relative to those that I do not. I am simply observing the world-around in-relation to myself. I may take stock of my own body, or that within which I am embodied, and in so doing, ascertain what I may, or may not, do with my body given some evaluation of the prevailing circumstances, and my body’s relation to these circumstances in the world-around. I become more aware of the limitations, and possibilities, of my own embodiment in ways that seem peculiar to me in that time and place. Still I am not looking for anything, in particular. Yet I believe I ‘know’ what I have sensed without intention that is specific.
In perceiving, I have shown intention that is specific. In interpretation, I have shown intention that is specific. The world does not reveal itself to me; it appears, as I would have it appear to me. There is both intention, and direction, in my perception and interpretation, ontologically. I conjure-up for myself, the world-around for me, and the world becomes in-itself-for-me. Through Sartrean ‘veils’ it appears as of any hue I choose. Collectively, the world reveals itself in ways, which appear to be similar for others. By this I mean that in genuine dialogue with others, other’s perception of their lived-world may show a high correlation to my own, and ‘we’ seem to be choosing to perceive the lived-world in much the same way as each other. Through empirical investigation, we may imagine that our own sense experience is a ‘true’ representation of experience in general; insomuch, as others appear to perceive the world in much the same ways as we do. But does this make our perceptions and interpretations any the more valid, and hence, more meaningful?
In discovering the world-around, the empiricist declares ‘that art thou’. The object/subject of investigation appears to be compiled of a number of attributes, or component parts, which the empiricist believes are commensurate with, or not with, a particular object. The more attributes the empiricist discovers for him or herself, the more the empiricist is likely to believe that s/he has found what s/he has been looking for. This assumes that the empiricist, already, knows something about what it is s/he has been looking for. S/he will recognise certain aspects of the object that s/he attends to, (i.e. the objective), and labels them accordingly as being either this, or that, (i.e. the subjective). This, for Merleau-Ponty, becomes the ‘object’, and ‘object’ experienced as doing either this or that becomes the subject through the process of ‘subject-object dialogue’. The empiricist may not recognise other aspects of the configuration in which the identified objects show relation, but in discovering anew that which/she had believed to be true, the empiricist is confronted with the opportunity to say something else about what s/he already believes to be ‘true’. In this sense, Meno is right to question whether it is possible to look for something when you don't in the least know what it is we are looking for? Science indeed would become a pointless exercise, if, this was indeed science. But we don’t look for what we already have no knowledge of, per se, we make the look, and certain aspects of the world-around that come into view are recognised from past experiences, whilst others appear lost to us, or unclear. Do we not compare what we find, (i.e. the immanent), with what we might possibly find, (i.e. the transcendent)? We compare what we have found with what would imagine we might find as “objects of intention by reason”.
It may well be that there are aspects of the world-around that we do not recognise. Our curiosity engages our semantic memory for similarities between the object of our attention, and prior experience of ‘it’ and what ‘it’ is believed to be ‘doing’. We may transcend our own experience by attempting to put components of our new experiences together in ways, which we believes should be possible. In this way, we construct as sense of the world-around that contains components of what we believe to be possible. Therefore, it is not that we look for something without knowing what it is; it is more that we look for things that we think might be, and conclude that we have found something by sense experience. Hence, the immanent, and the transcendent, become the same thing. By this I mean, the way we experience the world as one that seems to be put together within our own minds in ways which may be similar in-relation to others from an empirical perspective, but also in ways may be very different from an intellectual perspective. All knowledge seems to require an ability to indulge the imagination to look for thing that might, and represent what is found as a consolation of what seems both immanent, and transcendent.
We are not able to exclude the ‘familiar’ from the ‘unfamiliar’ without knowing something about what constitutes the ‘familiar’. We note that there is something about the ‘thing-doing’ (or the subjective) that seems different from our prior experience of the ‘thing-doing’. In other words, we sense that at the ‘edges’ of the object/subject of our intention, there appears to be a difference from what we believe is ‘true’ about the object/subject of our intention, and what we do not. We are uncertain. We acknowledge the possibility of constructing the world-around within our own minds in ways, which seems different, perceptually, by discerning what might, and what night not, possibly be true about the objects/subjects of our intention. We say that where others, also, share this experience, the possibility of what might be, and what might not be true, approaches certainty.
For instance, we get up each morning, our bedrooms seem familiar, or not as the case may be; and we initiate actions in familiar ways in-relation to what we believe to be true about the prevailing situation. We may find that there is a shoe in our path on the way to the bathroom. It is a familiar shoe’ insomuch, as we recognise the shoe; but, its position in space and time, prove to be unfamiliar. We may stumble on the way to the bathroom. We ‘throw’ ourselves into a place of uncertainty. We are unsure as to correct procedure for going to the bathroom, momentarily. We might turn, and ‘kick’ the shoe out of the way, check our bearings; that everything else appears to be where they are supposed to be, (i.e. in their familiar position roundabout), before proceeding on the bathroom. We bring to bear all our preconceptions about the experience/procedure of going to the bathroom, and what might be expected, to bear on the situation. The limitations within which this experience might occur have been pre-set.
We might look for reasons to explain why our experience at that time and place appear to be outside of the possibilities and limitations of our expectations. We may criticise the dog, or the children, as we continue on our journey. We may search for reasons as to ‘why’ this shoe had materialised for us at the time and place that it had. We have, already, decided that fault for our experience lies outside of our own range of possible ways for being-in-the-world as we are certain that we ourselves would not have left the shoe in a place where the possibility of us tripping over it remain very high. By this I mean, that we cannot remember leaving the shoe where we had left I the night before, (i.e. immanent), and that this would not normally be a place for us to leave the shoe, (i.e. the transcendent); therefore, we conclude that somebody, or something else, had left the shoe where you found that morning. We might even consider the intentionality of the act, and indeed, whether the act was purposeful. We are certain in that our ontological experience has put the world together in this way. What could this event possibly mean?
In the first instance, I had nearly tripped and hurt myself due to the
shoe that was lying in the hallway in a place that it should not have been.
Shoes should not be in the hallway, I should not trip over shoes that have been
left in the hallway, and I should not trip over something that should not have
been in the place it was at that time of the day. Shoes do not lie around in
hallways of their own accord, unattended.
Already, I am looking for something/someone to blame for my mishap, and
that someone is not likely to be me. This scenario reflects
Merleau-Ponty argues that the assumption of empiricism is due to the "experience error." The "experience error" is the error of attributing to a phenomenon what ‘a priori’ precepts dictate should be found in it. But this in-itself is not empiricism. Empiricism does not allow for the imagination as an aide for discovery beyond statements about what might, and might not be, outside of human experience at that time and place. Empiricism does not suggest that we ‘fill in the blanks’ when that within which we are embodied suggests that we should be experiencing more than we can sense at a given time-space continuum. Empiricism that does invite the ‘experience error’, (e.g. insomuch, as the activity does seem to view the phenomenon as always ‘hard-edged and determinate’ at its edges), and seems to so do no more so, than the phenomenology. Even the intellectualist’s experiences have limitations by virtue of the number of valid reasons that can be brought to bear on their projects in the world.
Experience then, too, seems hard-edged, and determinate, at any given time. We do not expect to find more than what we believe defines the object-subject in context. We appear to sense within fixed parameters, and deny the existence of other possible configurations of experiencing the object-subject in context. In this sense the immanent, and the transcendental seem to become indistinguishable. But sometimes we are surprised: we may sense more than we expect. It is not denied that we, often, transcend what is experienced within the context of our everyday lives, and that this seems to be a possibility which carries within it its own limitations. However, in so doing, we are not conducting empirical research. Scientific research seems to require that within what we believe to be true about the object of our intention, and the context in which this object may be found, we hope to discover something different about the object/subject of our intention by indulging the transcendent. We consider possible explanations for what the object may be observed ‘doing’ in-relation within a given context, (i.e. under specific conditions), by exploring “the thing, and the thing doing within a given context”. We hope to prove, or disprove our hypotheses; possibilities as yet, outside of our everyday experiences; by looking for what appears to be ‘different’ about the way the object-subject appears be within a given context. And sometimes we may be surprised by what we discover.
Our investigation into the subject of our intention carries with it its own possibilities, and limitations. What Heidegger would call the "ready-to-hand" is uncertain only at it edges. ‘Object-Subject in context’ experience does appear to be ‘fuzzy’ at its parameters; and not ‘hard-edged’. At the point where we realise our own limitations, and hence own our possibilities, we are confronted with uncertainty that seems inevitable. However, we seek to ‘fill-in’ areas of ambiguity in our everyday experience in ways that support the ‘constancy hypothesis’. Merleau-Ponty refers to ‘the constancy hypothesis’, and seem to be suggesting that: ‘for each point on the surface of a stimulus (what is seen), there is a point of stimulation on the retina. This leads to the reduction of the thing, and precept to atomistic elements’. It would seem that we create for ourselves everyday experiences that show a high correlation with our experiences, but this cannot deny the possibility of discovering something different about the object/subject of our intention. This begs the question as to how we could ever experience something anew, and as being different. If everything shows dynamism in relation such that nothing is ‘fixed, determinate and hard-edged’, does not the world then become unknowable outside of human existence. In the end, what we are left with is an inability to solve Meno's paradox. If, the world is unknowable, how will we know we've discovered something that is true?
Rationalism, like empiricism, is also rooted in the tradition of Descartes. It, also, understands truth as certainty, and begins with a split between subject, and object. An analogy may be made between the concepts of immanence, and transcendence. Within these same assumptions, however, it takes an opposite stance from empiricism. While empiricism claims that all knowledge of the world comes from experience, rationalism holds that all knowledge is ‘a priori’, (i.e. already known by the subject prior to experience). The mind organises or constitutes the things in experience, and we can never know the thing in-itself outside of experience (Kant is a good example of this perspective). For Kant, we can never know a thing-in-itself until it has revealed itself to us. The mind is an active originator of experience rather than a passive recipient of perception. If, perceptual experience is processed, how valid is our perception? It seems to me that we, already, know something about the thing-itself, as we would not be able to say what the thing in-itself is not. Hence, if did not know what we were looking for in the first place we would not know that we had found it. At its edges, there is revealed points of uncertainty, areas of fuzziness about which the object/subject of our intention presents less clarity. We attempt to ascertain the validity of our sense experience by considering the possibilities. We may not know that the totality of our experience, as this in-itself would require that the experience has no ‘fuzzy’ edges. As a probability, we can say something about its component parts, and as they I in turn appear to have been assembled, everything must be considered to be a product of our imagination – a possibility.
Knowledge in-itself, becomes the outcome of an intersubjective exercise – a fantasy. We do not know about things-in-themselves a part from our perception of them. For Kant, perception is a synthesis. Perception requires that we take appearances, and correlate these with previous experience, and the experiences of others. We apply reason to what we believe to be true about the world-around; its possibilities, and its limitations. Again this requires prior knowledge of the world; form and function; but this need not be total in its perception. Discovery then seems to require partial knowledge of the object of our intention. We know what we are looking, and sometimes we discover more or less that we expected. Physical sensation gives rise to an application of reason to experience results in the perception of phenomenal objects in context. This in-itself, tends to a rational science out of transcendental deduction. To illustrate, in observing that my foot has hit something on the floor. I look down, and identify the object as a shoe. I notice that it is shaped like a shoe. It is hard to the touch. It is made of what appears to be leather; there are laces. To all intents and purposes the reasons for my concluding that this is a shoe are ‘good enough’. The evidence that I have collected supports the view that it is a shoe. At the edges of this object, there is a background space, or horizon, that has depth. I am not able to say with any great certainty what occupies this space as my attention is focused on the shoe; the shoe being the source my immediate discomfort. At the edges of my experience, there is uncertainty. We cannot postulate the question, as did Meno, as it not possible to look for something without knowing what we are searching for. Intention is implicit with the ‘doing’ word – to search. We can discover something that we had not been searching for in so much as it is not what we expected to find in the first place. Hence, if I already know what I am seeking to discover, why bother searching if my intention is not to make use of it? For me, this is a nonsense question; and philosophy, as well as the sciences, would indeed, be a pointless endeavour.
Do we search for possibilities, and discover anew the limitations of what we already believe to be ‘true’. But we can be ‘ surprised’ in our search for the ‘truth’. We can come across a configuration of experience that in its totality appears to us, unfamiliar. We can set aside what we recognise as being familiar, and attend to the bigger picture which includes experiences which are not familiar, and which are given meaning by virtue of the ways in which the familiar is in relation to, and with, the unfamiliar aspects of the total experience. Out of this we create for ourselves hypotheses; assumptions; postulates, which attempt to explain how we might appear to be in-relation at some point in the future, with what we already believe to be ‘true’ in the here-and-now. We, as Merleau-Ponty says, give primacy to perception. But perception does not appear to precede scientific investigation. We establish our relation with the world-around through our ‘lived body’. All of our senses are brought to bear on the subject of our investigation. We withhold judgement until such time as we are able to say something about what the subject of our investigation is by virtue of what it is not. All aspects of our investigation are given equal importance, though primacy may be given to some aspect of our experience that fascinates us, or holds our curiosity the most. At the edges, the subject remains ‘fuzzy’. Uncertainty sets in, and we impose limitations, and hence possibilities, to the experience at hand, and do so in accordance with what our lived bodies believe might be possible.
Merleau-Ponty talked of the body as "flesh," made of the same flesh of the world, and it is because the flesh of the body is of the flesh of the world, that we can know and understand the world. To demonstrate this concept of the lived body, Merleau-Ponty uses the example of ‘the phantom limb’. A phantom limb would not be possible, if, our bodies were just machines. If, a part of the machine were severed from the rest of the machine, it would simply go without using the limb. Yet, people who have a limb amputated still ‘feel’ the limb, and they are still ‘called’ to use the limb in situations that call for its use; even though it is no longer there. In this same sense, the whole-lived body is an intentional body, which is lived through in relation to its possibilities in the world. Even when the limb is gone, ‘the possibilities for its use remain, but are unable to be taken up as a project in the world’. But these are not possibilities for its use, for the limb does not exist as part of the lived-body. It only exists as part of the imagination: a phantom limb. By transcendental deduction, we imagine it’s possibilities and limitations as having experienced them as such for oneself. It is, now, outside of human experience, and its existence appears to fade, overtime, as we come to realise that in reality it does not exist in-itself-for-us, nor any body else for that matter.
The idea of the lived body does not allows Merleau-Ponty to resolve Meno's paradox. The lived-body does appear to be both transcendent, and immanent both at the same time. However, this is a little different from Descartes Mind-body duality. We have a subject-object dichotomy; and yet, ask how we can be both the ‘same’, and ‘different’ at the same time. Things outside of our everyday experiences do not exist for us; except in the transcendent or what we might believe might be possible. We might believe that they exist in themselves, for themselves, and support such views with ‘evidence’ or ‘reasons’, but these things do not exist for us in the here-and-now as sense experiences. This does not mean that we need evidence or reasons to establish a belief or value as being valid, and hence meaningful. We can always sense something, and then pretend that it does not exist for us in the here-and-now, at all. We can never, physically, enter into dialogue with something or someone that does not exist beyond physical sensation without first considering the possibilities and limitations of so doing.
The object/subject may exist in-itself-for-itself, but it not exist for me in any tangible way. The thing exists "in-itself" because I resist my knowing it with in any real sense. The thing exists as a construct of my imagination; I have assigned certain properties, which are not subject to challenged until I chose to share these products of my intellectualism with the object of their ascription. However, the thing exists "for me" because I always experience it in-relation to my own body. It is sensed as being, and allowing me to do, something. A bed, for example, is something to lie on. A table is something to sit at, and eat at. Things allow for certain bodily engagements while closing-off, others. Our intentionality, therefore, has limitations and possibilities that may not reveal themselves until after the fact, or sensed experience. In this sense, to make the distinction between the transcendent, and the immanent seems pointless, as they both appear to be indicative of the possibilities of our intentions, and as such products of our imagination. Things may present for possibilities which seem both immanent, (i.e. possible, now), and transcendent, (i.e. possible at some point in the future; in so much, as things that appear to be given to experience, appear to be "in-themselves-for-me" only as a consequence of the lived-body. If, we did not indulge the imagination, science would be a pointless venture, and phenomenology would be impossible.
If, we can understand this idea of the "in-itself-for-me," we can see how experience as it is given to us is always a subject-object dialogue. I can never experience things independent of my experience as a bodily engaged being in the world; the meaning I bring to my perception is a perceiving which is embodied. It is by virtue of my embodiment that I can experience things as being up or down, as having insides or outsides, as being close or far away. Space is always in-relation to my body as situated within the world, or being-there. The same may be true of time. I am always situated in the present, on the way somewhere, or as having been somewhere. Thus, experience is always in the process of becoming, or coming into focus. Just when I am aware of things as ‘fixed, rigid, determinate, unchangeable, tangible, they become, indeterminate, fuzzy at the edges’ and ambiguous.
According to Merleau-Ponty, we know when we have found what we are looking for because the world is already pregnant with meaning in relation to the lived-body. Things begin as ambiguous, but become more determinate as I become bodily engaged with them, or turn my attention to them. I do not already know what I am looking for because at it edges, there are always something about which I am uncertain. Things come into view; we focus, and in so doing, things become ‘real’ for us. But how can they become real for us, if, we know nothing about the object-subject in context of our intention?
Merleau-Ponty, also, makes a distinction between the pre-reflective, and the reflective. When we reflect on experience, what we reflect on becomes hard-edged and determinate, (i.e. as having definite dimensions, and specific meanings). This reflected experience could be determinate and hard-edged only in-relation with indeterminate, ambiguous horizons or backgrounds. Experience is then built upon an original, pre-reflective, ambiguous ground that is the world-horizon. Experience begins in the pre-reflective, and reflection is always an abstract derivative of this primordial, pre-reflective, lived experience: the ready-to-hand. Reflection is not like the map compared to the un-reflected country-side as it is not possible to perceive ‘the country side’ as being ‘the country side’ without knowing something about what makes up the component parts of ‘the country side’. Does this not sound like transcendental deduction? We sense, apply what we believe to be true, and denote difference in what has been induced, to arrive at something that has been deduced from what has already been perceived.
In this sense, we become aware of ambiguity in-relation to ambiguity. Induction provides the data out of which we create for ourselves something that is deduced: you cannot have one with out the other. In the same ways, the horizon at which point defining features fade into obscurity, and uncertainty demands a revision of what we believe to be true about what we perceive, the reductionist is invoked, and the empiricist is called to bare witness to his/her incantations. This is possible because what is induced it, also, create for ourselves: deduction makes what is perceived ‘real’ for us. We sense with all that we are, (i.e. lived body), but we do not sense everything at once. This seems to confuse the senses, and overload the neural networks. Instead, we take little bits at a time, and put together the ‘patchwork quilt’ in the hope that the finished article is ‘true’ representation of the subject of our attention. That beyond the horizon swings into view bit by bit; not all at once. This in-itself leaves room for error; the ‘experience error’ as Merleau-Ponty puts it, but how do we know that we have made an ‘experience error’, when on reflection we are unable to give good-enough reason for what we have discovered to have occurred in the way that it had?
We cannot search for something that we don’t know exists. That would be like looking for nothing. What are we looking for, exactly? It is possible to find something that we had not expected to encounter in our searching, but this can only be described in-relation to what you already believe to be ‘true’ about being-in-the-world, and there is no certainty in that beyond the sensed experience. In discovering something anew, we have already told ourselves that what has been discovered appears to be, significantly, different from what we had previously believed to be ‘true’ about being-in-the-world. We can conjure-up for ourselves limitations, and possibilities, but not without some reference to what we already believe to be true about being in the world. Hence, ‘transcendental deduction’ relates what we already believe to be true with what might be possible, and this is empiricism as a phenomenological exercise. Empiricism is not supposed to prove what we already believe to be true, but to discover anew these facts, whilst at the same time being prepared to be ‘surprised’.
So, I make no distinction between science, and phenomenology, save to say that there is good science as much as there appears to be not so good, phenomenology. In writing, the researcher presents a point of view. In science, the researcher claims that the findings are common-to-all: in cognitive science, the researcher claims that the findings show consistency of behaviour within, and between groups of people observed doing the same task within a given context/situation. In Cognitive Psychology, the researcher makes claims that there is consistency behaviour between different variables within a ‘case study experiment’ where the client presents with a common complaint (Kirk, 1997). Such conclusions could be reached in phenomenology, but the researcher chooses not to make such claims. In all cases, the researcher presents a point of view for peer review. The article shows both an objective, and a subjective component. Each component seems meaningless without the others, and as Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre would maintain, show both object-subject duality.
Science attempts to minimise the subjective element, whereas phenomenology embraces the subjective. In all cases the researcher attempts to transcend everyday experience whether this be by setting an objective as in science, or by outlining a topic of investigation, as in phenomenology. By this I mean that, the hypotheses seem indicative of a set of possibilities that may well be outside of lived experience to date, and attempts to show to what extent these possibilities of being-in-the-world might be valid, and attainable. In phenomenology, the researcher attempts to describe everyday experience, and requires the participant to explore the possibilities and limitations of their potential projects in the world. Hence, all information shows validity whether that be scientifically-derived, or phenomenologically-derived, and I have been selective in the information that is used to explore social behaviour, (i.e. discrimination), that appears to purposive, as in this way the information maintains it’s relevance to the subject in question on this basis, phenomenologically.
The Movement Towards Social Exclusion
Our skin colour is something that we are given. Our genome when decoded determines for us what our skin colour will become in-relation with our lived-world. From birth, we are ‘clothed’ in it. It protects from the elements, and enables us to sense the world through the proprioception of heat, and pressure. It helps define our physical form, and shows little significant variation over time; at least, not in the same ways as our height, or hair colour, for instance. Hence, the symbolic representation of skin colour does not show the same ‘dynamicity’ as the rest of our physical form as suggested by Merleau-Ponty (1968). We are confronted with other people’s views and opinions of what it means to be this or that skin colour. Skin colour has become a means by which we identify ourselves in-relation to, and with others. Where there is little variation between people of differing skin colour, other aspects of our being may be brought into being to re-establish ‘separateness’, individuality, and distinction of one from the other. Individuality, and distinctiveness are not ‘bad’ in themselves, but the expression of distinction seem to conjure up all sorts of thoughts and feelings which are not readily understood after quantification.
Skin Colour, in-itself, as suggested above, is unlikely to show much variation over time, however, the way we chose to express ourselves, as someone who bares this or that skin colour does seem to vary greatly. We quick of ourselves as possessing this or that skin colour, and create values, or beliefs, which represent within our own minds our understanding of what it means to possess this or that skin colour. Buber (1966) in ‘‘The Knowledge of Man’ argues that it is through the process of genuine meeting that we come to ‘know’ something about what it means to be human. He argues that in turning to the other, the ‘primary movement’ is to set other a part; to establish functional, and even aesthetic value, in the other, and in so doing, impart on the other, independence: which is the second movement of ‘the principle of human life’. However, Buber complains that genuine meeting is a rare occurrence. He comments on moments within the context of his own life when the ‘flame the leaps’ between one person and the other is extinguished. Winnicott argues on the ‘duality of mother and child’ in-relation, and suggests that two cannot exist, independently, of each other. This begs the question to what extent is the other made independent in-relation, in this instance?
In observation, most people do seem motivated by a desire to maintain proximity to others; to “possess” that which may provide for all their needs; however, the ‘principle of human life’ does not, necessarily, show full movement as the other is denied independence. Is a baby so dependent on its mother that it has no individuality; no self-concept outside of her/his relationship with his mother? Does the child as s/he grows and develops reproduce this dependent relation until such time as s/he meets someone who in turning to him/her does make the developing child independent? The desire to maintain proximity to others may either be something that is learnt from the point of conception (Trevarthen, 1992); inherent within the human genome; or a combination of the two: the balance of evidence remains inconclusive. However, history seems to suggest that all behaviour aims to maintain “purposeful proximity” (Bateson, 1972), and deny proximity to that which would refuse, confuse, and/or de-value that ‘essence’ of being that includes the embodiment of the human person (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Brazelton and Cramer, 1991; Andersen et al, 1997). Hence, the objectification of the other seems inevitable. We seem to be doomed, genetically or otherwise, to enter in-relation within and between ourselves in ways, which have been cultivated, and reinforced, within the context of our everyday lives, since birth.
‘I-It relationships’ ensure that we will continue to ‘set at a distance’; separate-out; one person from the other, without entering into genuine meeting anything and everything that ceases to hold either aesthetic value, nor functional value for us within the context of our everyday lives. As individuals, make ‘value judgements’ about others based on the meaning attributed to that, which is presented (their defining features). Such sedimentations seem to influence our interaction with others, and with varying effect. Arguably, the Existential concerns of the those who do not possess a Black skin colour, may well reflect the Existential concerns of the society as whole: reflecting something that appears to be ‘common to all’. Existential concerns such as isolation, death, meaninglessness, certainly do seem to be common to us all, but Skin Colour carries its own meaning, and transcends time and space. It too does not change with the passage of time and place, and confronts us within the context our everyday lives in ways, which are inescapable. However, we may try to set aside our prejudices, the meaning we attribute to that aspect of the other that is their skin colour; continue to be ‘invoked’. We are forever called to be in-relation, but what of ‘the dissenter’? S/he who does not share your beliefs as to what it means to be embodied within one skin colour as opposed to another? Is s/he doomed to seek confirmation, and affirmation in-relation to, and with others, in ways that challenge his/her self-of-the-human-person? To what extent does A Black man’s perception of his own skin colour ensure that he is perceived as being someone; a self-of-being; that appears to be, persistently, at odds with those who do not appear to value this aspect of his/her person; neither aesthetically, nor functionally? Are the Existential concerns of the Black person so important that s/he must seek to opportunities, which threaten the possibility of extinction in-relation with others?
To answer these philosophical questions, I have resorted to search ancient Canaanite mythology to establish a basis for discrimination that may be experienced as ‘social exclusion’. I have chosen Canaanite mythology, primarily, because it seems to have been transcribed into different languages, and reinterpreted to suit a given culture, without losing much of its very ‘essence’. It is, also, very old, (i.e. 1500 BCE).
Ancient Historical Views on Oppression:
In the Canaanite text, a Babylonian King, Tilgarth-Pilneser, (circa. 716 BCE) was scorned by Isaiah, a prophet of the 7th century BC, for his pride and crimes against the Israelites (Wood, 1908). Godwin (1990) transcribes the Canaanite text to read:
How thou
hast fallen from Heaven, Helel, Son of Shaher,
Thou didst say in thy heart, I
will ascend to Heaven,
Above the
circumpolar stars I will raise my throne,
And I will
dwell in the Assembled Body in Mount Sapon,
I will mount
on the back of a Cloud,
I will be
like the ‘Most High’
(Ibid,
pg91-92)
‘Helel’ or ‘Lucifer’, ‘Son of the Dawn’, and ‘Bringer of Light’, it is argued, was ‘a dissenter’ in the Heavens. We are lead to believe that Lucifer questioned the ability of Humankind to remain faithful to God in the face of adversity. His reasons for so doing are unclear. However, the Bible does tell of his numerous “trips” to Earth to test-out Mankind’s propensity to disobedience (i.e. sin). I am not entirely convinced as to the autonomy of ‘Satan, the Accuser’s’ actions. It would seem that God himself sat in judgement as to the worthiness of mankind, and usurped ‘Archangel Michael’, and the Nephilim, Helel, in this project. It seems that in Mankind’s defence, Archangel Michael attempts to show that some of humankind is more worthy than others. In accusation, He’lel sets out to show the contrary. The Bible makes many references to the ‘Morning Star’, insisting that, ‘Archangel Michael will become as the Morning Star (Rev. 22.16). In particular, the way Isaiah (14:12-22); and other contributors to the Bible; make the analogies between the behaviour of the ‘King of Babylon’; and relate this behaviour with ‘Lucifer, Son of the Dawn’. It was suggested that King Tilgarth-Pilneser had exalted himself over an above others in much the same way as the ‘Morning Star’ (planet ‘Venus’) appears to do as she rises high in the Dawn sky in lieu of the Sun rising.
‘Satan, the Accuser’, does not appear to ‘mock’ God in the same ways as Isaiah appears to be ‘mocking’ the Kings of Babylon in the Bible. Instead, He’lel (Satan Lucifer) merely seems to be doing the Lord God’s bidding, (i.e. creating adversity, or inflicting suffering with God’s permission). In so doing, Mankind is confronted with life’s many difficulties. We appear to be tempted towards disobedience to God, (i.e. to sin). In ‘mocking’ the ‘King of Babylon’, whose pride was reflected in his efforts to assume a place in Heaven; though seated high above the ‘Most High’; Isaiah showed; in parable; how pompous this King of Babylon really was in his ways of being. In the same ways as ‘Satan, The Accuser’, sets out to prove that mankind would, readily, denounce ‘Jehovah’ in the face of adversity, The Kings of Babylon too, will be cut down, and thrown into the ‘bottomless pit’ for his crimes against humanity.
It was interesting to read how the King of Babylon’s belief in his own ways of being-in-the-world, reflected his cultural beliefs about ‘hero worship’ of that time: something not uncommon at the time (Wood, 1908). He commented on ‘how filled with pride’, this ‘King of Babylon’ assumed that he would ‘hold counsel with the Assembled Body’, and how he would ‘set his throne above that of, God Himself’; in spite of his own apparent crimes against humanity. Clearly, these ‘Kings of Babylon’ did not consider their exploits to be ‘crimes’. These ancient Kings desired to be worshipped as ‘heroes’, and therefore, were unlikely to experience ‘guilt’. But the Canaanite text, also, suggests that Lucifer did nothing without prior consultation with God, and usually, in the apparent hope of proving to God that humankind was unworthy of God’s adoration and trust. He doubted that Humankind could withstand too much pain and suffering, and yet Lucifer experienced no pain, and suffering himself. We hear tell of the way in which he moved freely abut the heavens, apparently unchallenged, and having the ear of God himself, and yet Lucifer seems unsatisfied with this. He sought to show God how mistaken he was to give Humankind freedom to choose – free will. Yet Lucifer never proclaims his own free will. His behaviour suggests that he has no love for mankind, yet he never actually says so, himself. He seems to fear God, and this may deter him from making direct challenges to authority. He certainly does not seem to want ‘exalt his throne over and above God’s’. Lucifer, as with other members of the Angelic Host do not appear to possess free will. They exist only in-relation to God himself. Only God turns to Lucifer, and makes him present. We are Lucifer does nothing without God’s blessing. Where’s as humankind are able to make mistakes, to exercise their ‘free will’ to chose one form of expressing themselves over and above another.
It was the ‘King of Babylon’ who appears to have been denied a sense of self-importance before God, the ‘greater good’. ‘Pride came before the Fall’, but why does God (“the greater good”) demand that all no-one should set themselves in higher authority that He, and deny us the right to hold counsel with Him in much the same way as ‘Michael’, and ‘Helel’? In the same ways, are we, as human beings, not playing-out this same story here on Earth, over and over again, to the detriment of those who are considered dissimilar enough from those who assume godlike status within the context of our everyday lives? Is ‘the dissenter’ required to ask permission before assuming the same rights as those who would assume such self-importance, and in so doing exalt themselves over and above everyone else? Are we doomed to set those against whom we discriminate on the grounds of skin colour a part, without making them independent in-relation with the ‘dominant culture’; the self-acclaimed ‘greater good’ for time immemorial?
‘There is not one personality trait of the
Negro the source of which can not be traced to difficult living conditions.
There is no exception too the rule. The final result is wretched internal life’
Kardiner and Ovesey (1951:3)
Human beings , who are forced
to live under Ghetto conditions, and whose daily experiences tells the, that
almost no where in society are they respected, and granted the ordinary dignity
and courtesy accorded others will begin to doubt their self-worth
Kenneth
Clarke (1965: 63)
Is Social Exclusion: inevitable
Pondering this state of affairs within the context of my own everyday life. I have wondered whether the phenomena of ‘setting aside without making independent’ are new, and simply are reflection of the human condition. History seems saturated with the assertion of one scheme of things over and above another such that one civilisation, or way of being-in-the-world, assumes relative superiority over and above another, with the subjugation of ‘the other’. ‘The other’ has been set aside without making independent. Historical documents like the Bible is full of stories which show how this struggle for individual identity and power in-relation between, and within’ ancient societies is often foretold by a ‘man of vision’ – the prophet. The idea of setting oneself above one person/people seems to be followed by the subjugation of that which would set itself above and against another becomes inevitable. Whether this is a simple reflection of what has happened in the past, or whether this is simply wishful thinking remains difficult to ascertain. Suffice to say that all-things-considered; such prophecies would not seem unreasonable in the ‘greater scheme of things’.
Uncovering the earliest accounts of this ways of being-in-the-world, it is said that, ‘In the beginning, God created all living things, and demanded that their talents be used to glorify Him’. But He‘lel; more commonly referred to as ‘Satan’ or ‘Lucifer’, is alleged to have said unto himself, ‘am I not worthy of praise’, am I not as the bright, and Morning Star, and God allegedly said, ‘no - only I am worthy of praise’. For his transgression in-relation to God, He’lel, is said to have been ‘thrown to Earth’ (Rev.12:8). The bible says, ‘ Woe for the Earth, and the Sea, for Satan has come down to You with great wrath knowing his time is short’ (Rev. 12:12). He’lel, may have been aware of her own self-importance; after all he was allegedly ‘choirmaster of one third of the heavenly throng’. Perhaps, she could not accept that mankind could be as deserved of God’s love and admiration as he was? Helel seemed to be demanding that, ‘he experience a sense of value that was greater than that accorded to mankind’, and tried to show her greater worthiness in-relation to mankind, by showing God the extent of humankind unworthiness– the sin of mankind.
Interestingly, Helel never seemed to speak her grievances to God. She never revealed those aspects of herself that would have suggested how vulnerable she felt in-relation with mankind. At no time do we read about how he said, ‘I feel unworthy, neglected, annoyed, angry, jealous, or disaffected’, in-relation to God. He, merely, reported on the transgressions of mankind in the face of adversity. God, in judging this heavenly debate gave, both the Defence, represented by ‘Michael’, and the Plaintiff, represented by ‘Helel’, a finite time-frame within which to collate evidence for, and against, the claim that in the face of adversity, mankind would sin, (i.e. be disobedience to God).
It is unfortunate, that He’ lel chose humankind to prove her point. In dialectic debate with God, he attempts to show how people can lose faith in the face of adversity (Book of Job). God apparently sanctions the prevalence of this ‘illusion’, and offers He ‘lel the caveat of human weakness as her ‘tool’. In fact, it is Helel’s ‘will-to-power’, that is thwarted; not that of humankind. He ‘lel sets out to deceive, and tempt mankind saying, ‘that art thou, sinner’, but he never seems to be able to collate enough evidence to convince the heavenly Court of mankind’s unworthiness. Helel has proven that mankind could be disobedient, but the extent of that disobedience is not ‘an absolute’. He ‘lel has been shown that ‘Pride often came before the Fall’, but the idea that such a fate would beset her for he has never made his own, personal, Existential doubt intentions known to God. He soldiers on; collating more, and more, evidence knowing that his time within which he must show how unworthy mankind is, is in-itself-for-itself. It is clear that, Helel fears God enough to refrain from, courageously, informing him of her own concerns. He fears being ‘authentic’ in-relation with God, and in so doing, seems to avoid experiencing His wrath, personally. (Humankind seems oblivious, or indifferent to this fear). It could be argued that Helel is aware of the God’s great power; having been there at the Beginning; but, to continue to ‘hide’ his own desires in the ways that he has, and to use mankind; almost, as a vehicle for her deliberations with God; seems ‘unfair’. He ‘lel appears to be knowledgeable, but does not seem to know, enough. In usurping the serpent in the Garden of Eden, he argues that eating from the ‘Tree of Life’ would open Eve’s eyes, and that Eve would ‘know’ the difference between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, and in so doing, become ‘more like God’ (Genesis Ch. 3).
The idea of the God using Mankind in these ways is not uncommon. Greek Mythology seems to be full of stories showing how the God’s toyed with mankind in one-way, or another. In Greek Mythology too, man is readily set aside, but never made independent. By this I mean there is always the fear of injunction, hanging like the ‘Sword of Damocles’ over mankind’s head. There is no escape, nor avoidance, here either. But ’why’ does God (“the greater good”) not want mankind to know the difference between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, and in so doing, become more like Him?
It is assumed that when ‘our eyes are opened’, we come to see the world-around-us in all it’s splendour, surprise, and mystery. We become more aware of the significance of being-in-the-world, and how this may differ from our own sense of being-with-ourselves. This can but give rise to Existential angst, and anxiety. Transcendence, and the process of becoming seems require knowledge of self in-relation to, and with, the lived-world, and that being-for-ourselves requires the dynamic movement of information between the ‘self of the human person’, and the world-around us, to create a self-of-being that is reflective of this dynamicity and knowledge. From this discourse, we create a ‘self of being’ that reflects the extent to which we are autonomous, and independent. We realise that we are ‘free to choose’ within the constraints that prevail at that time, that we are alone, ultimately, and that our lives when devoid of ‘faith’ seem to hold little meaning for us: after all where is the struggle in life without ‘faith’. For ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve’, their ‘self of being’ was in-relation to, and with themselves, and God. They seem to have been either unaware, or unconcerned about, their ‘nakedness’ prior to eating from the ‘Tree of Life’. After eating their eyes became open, and suddenly, that within which they were embodied – their ‘nakedness’ — became revealed to them as something they should hide from God, and themselves. They seem to have forgotten that God made was present when they were made: He had seen their ‘nakedness’. But ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve’ thought it fitting to hide their ‘self of the human person’, and become this ‘self of being-in-the-world’ the reflected their newfound knowledge of ‘nakedness’.
Clearly, ‘knowledge’ is a dangerous commodity that is reserved only for God, or the ‘greater good’. In these ways, God (or the greater good) seems to protect us from ourselves, by preventing us from experiencing anxiety and angst. By controlling the extent to which are ‘autonomous’, ‘free to choose’, alive, and meaningless, He allowed the ‘self of the human person’ to remain an enigma; a mystery; to ourselves in-relation to, and with God. In isolation from God (the ‘eternal’), we are confronted with the possibility of experiencing ‘nothingness’ (Kierkegaard, 1844). Instead of ‘turning outwards’, we turn inwards; after all, God has deserted us. We become aware of the difference between what we were asked to do, (i.e. our ‘selves of the human person’), and what we did do, (.i.e. our ‘selves of being’). We become more aware of that within which we are embodied, how this might differ from others, and become enthused with doubt as to its significance in-relation to the world-around-us. God is no longer able/willing to say ‘that art thou’ for you have ‘hidden’ yourselves. God may have been aware of Adam and Eve’s nakedness, but sought to prevent them from ‘discovering’ this for themselves in-relation with both himself, and with each other. He forbade them to eat of the ‘Tree of Life’ that would enable them to ‘discover’ that which had previously remained ‘hidden’, and hence remain ignorant of themselves, and doomed to an existence that could not become anything more than it that which God desired. Their ‘self of being’ in-relation to, and with their lived-world showed no dynamicity until the eat the forbidden fruit, and in so doing, they became aware of the ‘essence’ of God. In the same ways, those who would aspire to the lofty heights of the ‘greater good’ also seem to deny access to information from those who would chose to discover themselves in relation to the ‘greater good’. They protest that, ‘it is for our own good that this knowledge be withheld’. But, is it not a greater truth that, in not offering opportunities that would increase our life chances, the ‘greater good’ inhibits us from becoming anything more than we are, (i.e. a product of their creation, to be used and abused at will, without possibility of recourse)? Are we not doomed to an interdependence that is reflective of a lived-world without end?
If, we make an analogy between ‘the greater good’, (as representing the ‘dominant culture within any given society’,) and ‘He lel’, (as representing the ‘disaffected grouping within any given society’), it would seem that the dominant culture within our society must curtail the desire to ‘be’, and to ‘become’ in those who would like to transcend their everyday experiences in-relation to the dominant culture, (i.e. those who often feel disaffected within our society). The dominant culture must risk being confronted with the possibility of appearing ‘no greater than anybody else’. The apparent fear of some sort of annihilation deters the ‘setting of the other a part’, and ‘making independent’, those who would be like ‘God’ (Buber, 1966). It is assumed that where there are those within any society who would value themselves over and above all those, there will be those who will question the moral judgement of the apparent social order with varying effect.
Inasmuch as those who share similar defining features as those of ‘greater good’, the current ‘order of things’ must be judged unsustainable, overtime. Those societies where “individual glorification”, and a “sense of self-worth”, may only be experienced within the context of genuine dialogue, increasing the proximal distance between self, and the other, merely serves to denounce the existence of the other, and render him/herself, inhuman. Those who value themselves over and above others with inevitable dire consequences may be forced to consider he possibility that their own existential concerns are, inextricably, interwoven with those the disaffected members of society. In denying the human existence of those who do not share ‘enough’ of their own defining features, and in failing to ‘make present’ the other through the process of genuine dialogue, the ‘greater good’ may well be sealing its own fate, and annihilation (Nietzsche, 1882). In offering the individual the opportunity to value only those who would be like ‘God, the greater good’, a sense of individual self-worth becomes obscure, and denied, beyond the testimony to this fact by those who would assume the role of the ‘greater good’. Creativity that is, arguably, common to all seems ‘thwarted’ in-relation to, an with, those who have assume this role within any given society.
This ‘primary schemata’ seems to be reflected within the global society today, and to have been since time immemorial, apparently. Some aspects of ‘self’ seem to given permission for expression, whilst there are those ‘defining features’ which others do not share, and still find difficult to accept as ‘being of equal value’. Western society has outlawed ‘discrimination’ based on skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, even disability, etc., but those who possess these defining features do not seem to be benefiting from such changes in the Law. ‘Discrimination’ has become founded on a ‘system of beliefs’, which remain either ‘hidden’, or expressed covertly. Consequently, challenges to such expression remain difficult at the best of times. How do you challenge something that appears to be represented in the behaviour of others without the other making explicit claims to their presence within the context of genuine dialogue with those experiencing discrimination? It is not my intention to enter into dialectic about what this system of beliefs may be. However, attempts to elucidate how such values/beliefs appears to inform behaviour, which on interpretation, can lead to emotional distress, and poor health in those people who experience discrimination as an integral part of their everyday lives. The illegality of discrimination based on skin colour ensures that discriminatory beliefs often remain hidden, and hence the validity of such challenges seems difficult irrespective of the given context. It, therefore, remains for those disaffected to become more aware of their own thoughts and feelings in-relation with those who appear to be discriminating against them, and reinterpret such behaviour in-relation with their lived-worlds such that the ‘transcendence’ is shown beyond that which may otherwise be expected.
Those of us, who would value their own defining features above and against those who do not share the same defining features, seem to show little concern for those affected by their discriminatory behaviour. Such people do not seem to be, overly, concerned with the well-being of mankind in totality, and show this by ensuring that their privileged position is maintained in-relation to everyone else, and regardless of the cost in human suffering. We can not say that such people are unaware that their social status is inextricably linked to that of everyone else, as considerable effort seems to go into maintaining the prevailing social order. This shows significance where we consider that those who discriminate often determine, and apportion opportunity. In recognising others who do not share the same defining features, those who discriminate are asked to re-evaluate their own sedimentations about self in relation to those who appear to be, significantly, different. It is almost as, if, their own sense of value is being challenged in some way. But this would not be the case, if, those who discriminated against others accepted the possibility that their defining features were no more of value than those of others - just ‘different’. Hence, ‘how’ in a society where the boundaries between self, and others are being, continually, eroded do you initiate a system of beliefs that values ‘difference’; whilst, maintaining the lower echelons of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, (i.e. life sustenance, safety and security, etc.,); where there are certain groupings within our society who would demand that a discriminating social order be maintained, overtime? If, it is argued that certain needs may be met by some at the expense of others, (e.g. creativity, self-expression that differentiates ‘self’ from others, etc.,), are we not at risk of destroying ‘humanity’, itself?
It concerns me that many young people today, irrespective of their skin colour, seem to value the use of illegal drugs for their “anaesthetising effect”. Within the context of our everyday lives, and in spite of guidance normally associated with religiosity amongst younger people, these drugs have become the ‘the new god’. It is, too, simplistic to state that they have replaced God as the ‘opiate of the people’; a means of consolation, or quiescence; essential for ensuring much needed ‘avoidance/escapism’ from a tiresome reality of everyday life in the absence of answers to this persistent question. Yet, others have chosen to use the legal drugs prevalent within our society to achieve the same effect! Still, others seem to have chosen other ways of destroying; in one-way, or another; those that which no longer provides enough protection as the Existential givens that they fear would thwart their very existence (Yalom, 1980). In the middle of this continuum, there are those who ‘tread the fine line’ between existence, and non-existence - ‘to be or not be’, (this remains the question), and ‘suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’ from which there seems to be no escape, nor avoidance (Jaspers, 1951; Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997, pg 72). Are not doomed to ‘struggle’ in our everyday lives? No one seems to have the answer because the converse of the original argument seems to be, equally, true; yet ‘He lel’, in his covert revolt, implies by her actions that there is an answer. I remain uncertain. In ceasing to be autonomous, and accepting our interdependence, there is nothing with which to struggle with our everyday lives, the self of the human person disappears from view, and has no meaning. In accepting our autonomy, we do not accept our interdependence, we struggle with our everyday lives, the self of human person is ‘hidden’ behind the ‘self of being’ in-relation with the lived-world, often inadvertently. In both scenarios, the ‘self of the human person’ seems to remain ‘hidden’ from view. Hence, the outcome is the same - annihilation.
Yet, I ponder the question as to ‘what this ‘greater good’ is, as history dictates that, as even this seems to shift with the passage of time, and place, and hence remains open to interpretation? In becoming more like God, we threaten the status of God within the greater scheme of things. Can we not all be Gods together? Apparently, not. Despite our varying talents we can not all be as God’s in our own right, with our own special talents, and ways of being-in-the-world that reflect the ‘truth’ of our ‘self-as the-human-person. The ‘greater good’ has decreed it, and we are engaged in battle with the ‘greater good’ who denies us the know-how on the basis that we will turn away from that which exalts itself over and above us, on fear of annihilation. In this sense, Nietzsche claims that, ‘God is dead’. We have turned away from Him, and in so doing, brought the world-around-us into view.
Hence, we continue to ‘throw ourselves’ into a lived-world of ‘uncertainty’. We are not thrown as suggested by Husserl (1929), as this would deny the existence of ‘intentionality’. By this I mean that our behaviour shows some degree of intentionality. We attend to some aspects of our everyday existence, and ignore others. We, selectively, bring into consciousness aspects of our being-in-the-world, whilst at the same time ignoring others. We do not find ourselves in particular situations, we are not ‘thrown’, per se, we enter into them, purposefully, and hence, we appear to ‘throw’ ourselves: always uncertain of the outcome, and the temporality of our being-in-the-world. Our existence, persistently, challenged from one moment to the next, and void of any conclusion that would relieve our ‘inner tensions’. Our emotions swell, and colour our interpretation of our ‘lived-worlds’ to the extent that we seem to loose sight of the content of our ‘self-reflective knowledge’. We are in-relation to, and with, in our lived-worlds in ways which can but ‘objectify’ others (Kierkegaard, 1844/1980; 1849/1980). We know about our lived-worlds than we know about ourselves. We seem to be blind to the view that ‘what we see in others’ tells us more about ourselves than it will ever do about the other. It is hoped that a thorough phenomenological investigation (Husserl, 1925; Ihde, 1986) into the experience of discrimination that appears to be based on skin colour; as opposed to ‘race’; will do much to illuminate this phenomena we call discrimination, in-itself, and in so doing, present a way forward for people of colour; if, not humanity itself.
THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DISSOCIATION, AND BLACK MEN’S SENSE
OF IDENTITY
‘Dissociation’ seems to be characterised by distinct changes
in a person’s sense of identity, memory, or consciousness (Davison and Neale,
1994, p178). However, ‘depersonalisation’, is a form of ‘dissociative disorder’
which characterised by ‘a loss of self’, but there seems to be no obvious
disturbance in memory, nor ‘flow of consciousness’, and the individual does not
display more than one ego state. It is suggested that ‘Schizophrenia’ is a much
more intense form of depersonalisation, and as such quite different from ‘a
true dissociative disorder’ such as ‘multiple personality disorder’. The
criteria for diagnosis of ‘a dissociative disorder’ requires that the
individual demonstrates a ‘loss of memory’, and that the different ‘alter egos’
identified are quite separate comprising a fully integrated, and complex, set
of behaviour patterns, memories, and relationships, at any one time (Davison
and Neale, 1994, p180).
However, it could be argued that some ‘Black’ people seem to
‘learn’ how to dissociate their true thoughts and feelings about their
‘Blackness’ from their apparent thoughts and feelings, and almost assume a
‘second identity’ in response to ‘racial’ discrimination (Sue, 1981; Rack,
1982; Rose, 1997). Whether such dissociation is indicative of ‘mental illness’,
has yet to be determined (Dunn et al, 1994). However, it could be argued that
dissociating one’s true feelings about his/her skin colour may, actually, be a
normal process’; more prevalent and, perhaps more pronounced in Black people
who may be, experiencing emotional distress as a consequence of other factors
prevalent within their daily lives, (e.g. socioeconomic, or health factors),
concomitantly. But to suggest that such dissociation is indicative of the
presence of ‘mental illness’, seems restrictive, and says very little about the
effect prevalent adversity may have within the context of Black people’s lives.
Differentiating between criteria that would be indicative of ‘a dissociative disorder’, and that which would typify ‘depersonalisation’, seems difficult. On the one hand, slight deviation from the ‘norm’ which is personal integrity, observed in some Black people, may well be a meaningful way of ‘separating-out’ those aspects of self with which the ‘ego’ finds difficult to cope. No loss of memory, nor flow of consciousness, is observed. This kind of dissociation observed in some Black people may, then, be viewed a pervasive, but ‘normal’: an adaptive response to the felt experience of discrimination based, purely, on the colour of their skin, (i.e. such as that described by Rose, 1997). On the other, deviation from that which may be considered to be reflective of a more intense form of dissociation, (i.e. tending to a multiple personality disorders), where the individual seems to be demonstrating a number of different personalities, (i.e. one constructed to change the interpretation of their everyday lives at the same time and place), would suggest that the individual is unable to accept their skin colouration and personal integrity may be ‘sacrificed’ for greater social acceptance, elsewhere. The denial of; or the expression of anger directed at; such an important aspect of ‘self’, may carry with it, as yet, undefined consequences for the health and well-being of Black communities in the