The Importance Of Perception When Discriminating Against People Of Colour Within Western Societies: An Existential Approach.

Perception; it is argued; provides the means by which we are able to give meaning to our interactions with the ‘lived-world’. Through it, we are able to gain some insight, and hence describe ways in which we are relational to the ‘lived-world’. It is an interpretation of that which is made ‘known’ to us by our senses. Perception is, therefore, dependent on the capability of that within which we are embodied to, accurately, detect sensation external to our central nervous system.

Little sensation is thought to arise from within the central nervous system, (i.e. the cerebral cortex and spinal cord do not seem to be aware of pain in the same way as the skin for instance). Merleau-Ponty (1962) has catalogue the ways in which we become aware of our embodiment, and stresses how we pay attention to different aspects of our body to varying degrees. So for instance, if asked to draw a picture of ourselves we characteristically tend to apply more detail to the face, and upper regions of our body, and less detail to the outer limbs, and lower abdomen. It is argued that the detail applied when drawing the face, is indicative of the amount of attention we pay to this region of ours bodies, and how observant we are of the face’s ‘defining features’. But this drawing is, merely, a representation of how we have perceived ourselves in our mind’s eye.

Without very much practice, a drawing of a face will always be an interpretation of what artist perceives. Wertz (1982) identified two different ways of perceiving, (i.e. the ‘appreciative’, and the ‘pragmatic’), and argued that perception seems to be “functional”; it performs a ‘role’. Perception that is ‘appreciative’ seems to fulfil the ‘role’ within our mind’s eye which seems it be indicative of the extent to which that, which is sensed has some intrinsic value. Perception that is ‘pragmatic’ tends to provide a means by which that objects/subjects can be characterised according to their ability to enable us to carry out a task. In the latter, perception does not seem to enable the perceiver to appreciate that, which is sensed for its intrinsic value; perhaps there is none. But it does enable the ‘perceiver’ to carry out specific functions with out confusing the issue with concerns about possible loss/destruction of the apportioned intrinsic value. So, appreciative perception, arguably, seems to enable us to relate in the ‘lived-world’ in ways, which that might be indicative of our appreciation of an object or person’s intrinsic value, whilst pragmatic perception enables us to relate to the ‘lived-world’ in ways which might be construed as being more “functional”. Clearly, each individual will perceived objects external to self in different ways, and that which might be perceived by some, appreciatively, may not be perceived in quite the same ways as others.

These different; but, interrelated; ways of perceiving seem to be indicative of our tendency to objectify some people in some situations/events of everyday experiences of ‘being-in-the-world’, whilst “subjectifying” people in others. The people with whom we seem to relate, readily, may be represented within our own minds in ways, which would be more indicative of the intrinsic value they hold for us. Whilst others we relate to in ways, which would be more indicative of the extent to which they are considered of use to us; their functional value. The decision ‘to relate’ seems to be associated to our purpose for interaction. Hence, those we perceive as being physically, socially, personally, or spiritually ‘attractive’ might be more reflective of ‘an appreciative perception’ of those people. This suggests that those with whom we perceive as being of little ‘use’ to us may not be perceived in much the same way. This assumption would, also, explain why we tend to describe ourselves in terms of what we do, as opposed who we are as individuals.

If, it is argued that appreciative, and pragmatic perception may be explored along all four dimensions mentioned above (Van Deurzen, 1997), it could then be shown that there may be considerable ‘overlap’ between these two types of perception. For instance, objects/ people may now be perceived as being, intrinsically, valuable to a greater or lesser extent on physical, social, personal, and spiritual dimensions. Similarly, objects/people may be perceived as being, pragmatically, valuable to a greater or lesser extent along the same dimensions. Both appreciative, and pragmatic perception can now be explored using the same dimensions. More importantly, objects/people can, now, be perceived in ways, which are reflective of a ‘dual perception’, (i.e. possessing both intrinsic qualities which are appreciated, and functional qualities which are pragmatic). For example, an antique may be perceived as an object, which seems to hold both appreciative, and pragmatic qualities. However, the extent to which we choose to engage with objects that are perceived, as being of ‘neither use, nor ornament’, may be more reflective of the degree of ‘angst’ experienced during encounter with such objects.

‘Angst’ may arise as we evaluate the extent to which others exhibit qualities, which we ourselves consider to be ‘appreciative’, (i.e. the extent to which these qualities are hold some intrinsic value for us), and the extent to which, others exhibit qualities that we consider to be pragmatic, (i.e. the extent to which these qualities hold some ‘functional’ value for us). If, it is argued that the greater the uncertainty, or angst we experience in relation to others, the greater the tendency to distance ourselves from others, then it would not, be unreasonable to assume that we may tend to relate to people depending on some internal evaluation of their appreciative, and/or pragmatic qualities (Blau, 1964). Those people who are perceived as having fewer appreciative qualities; or, perceived as being of less intrinsic value; may be more likely to be perceived as if they were ‘objects’ (Murstein, 1972). Whereas those people who are perceived as being reflective of people who possess more intrinsic value may be perceived much more subjectively; as if they were ‘real’ people. This suggests that some idea of that which may be construed as being, intrinsically, valuable, and that which may not, is held within the mind’s eye of all of us.

Perception that results in the experience of ‘angst’, or ‘doubt’, as to the extent to which an object may be appreciated for it’s intrinsic value, may result in the decision-making that is more reflective of a person’s evaluation of that object. This may be explored with the aim of determining that object’s ‘functional’ value. Perhaps, we ‘distance’ ourselves from those objects that are do not seem to have enough intrinsic, and/or functional value? In any case, such reflective ability would seem to rely on some prior comparison with knowledge we, already, hold about the essence of object being perceived. Where that which is perceived conflicts, highly, with that which is ‘known’ about a particular object or person, and/or holds negative connotations in relation to the said object, or person, we might conclude that this object/person might best be ‘kept at a distance’. The word ‘distance’ is used to describe the space between self, and other, and to include both mental space, and physical space (Hall, 1959; 1966).

The phenomenological viewpoint in reference to perception is perhaps best illustrated by making comparisons between, pictures drawn of our own body, and say photographs, taken of the same body (Moss, 1989, p64). On completing the task, it will be noticed that the drawings show how each component, comprising your body, are in relation to the others. If, the drawings are then compared with photographs of the same body, it will be noticed that some aspects of the drawings may seem ‘larger’ than they actually are, whilst others will appear ‘minimised’; or, even ‘missing’ out altogether. How is this possible? Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggests that such “artistic” representations of the body are examples of the ‘lived or experienced-body’; they are interpretations of ‘how’ we appear to ourselves in our own ‘mind’s eye’. If, we ask others to draw a picture of ourselves, they too will present a subjective evaluation of ourselves, which will be; significantly, different from a picture we might have drawn of ourselves (Moss, 1989, p68).

This picture then becomes an interpretation of ‘how’ we are sensed in other’s mind’s eye. It is, therefore, argued that it is not possible to present an objective view of the ‘lived-world’ as it is experienced: unless such a view is produced, mechanistically, and devoid of all prior knowledge and feeling. But, discrimination seems to be enthused with apparent prior knowledge and feeling with respect to an identifiable object or person. These thoughts and feelings are, often, negative ones, and seem to create a sense of distaste. Those who discriminate seem to create out of a sense of ‘uncertainty’, either feelings such as resentment, and/or anger, which when ‘acted-out’ infer a sense of non-appreciation of those they have discriminated against. The effect seems to be to either mentally/intrapsychically, or indeed, physically distance themselves from the offending object. When asking those who have spent many years of their lives discriminating against others, why they continue to relate to some people in the way that they do, they have often described the ways they have been in relation to the ‘lived-world’, mechanistically. Their actions seem devoid of any forethought, (i.e. without reflection). It seems as if very little thought has, actually, gone into their acts of discrimination. It is almost as, if, they had, already, made up their minds with reference to the subject matter. This implies that this form of behaviour has, already, been assimilated, and accommodated, at some point in their life history; and, is more or less, automatically, reproduced in, carefully, designated contexts and under certain conditions.

Contextual and descriptive analysis of such situations/events, from my own personal casework, in which discrimination against people of colour had taken place, would suggest that an association had been made between the defining features of a person, or group of people, with some form of perceived personal threat. It is argued that such perceived threat is indeed, a preconception, and bares little reflection on the nature of the person discriminated against. So, the person who discriminates seems to believe that some aspect of their very existence is being threatened; that they could be denied something of great value to them; that something had could be taken away from them and that they would be ‘powerless’ to do anything at the time; and would attempt to distance themselves from; even annihilate; the “offending object” or person one way or another.

Assuming that this is a ‘valid interpretation’ of how some people discriminate against people of colour, this ‘self-reflective knowledge’ becomes indicative of people who are, apparently, angry and/or resentful on an impersonal level. Impersonal because these people usually do not know the person they are discriminating against on a personal level. It is more reflective of someone who experiences great ‘angst’ when in relation with people of colour in their ‘lived-world’ on either a physical, and/or social level. It may then be argued that the feelings/emotions ‘invoked’ in those who discriminate seems to be associated with something else: something or someone other than the person, or object, with whom they have, now, chosen to taken issue. Further, Contextual and Existential analysis often seems to precipitate into thoughts and feelings that may be best located in some other time-space continuum in the perpetrator’s life history. Perhaps, ‘an experienced crime against self, or a significant other’, ‘the loss of a loved-one’, (i.e. the experience of personal emotional and/or physical injury), has left the perpetrator believing that all those who share similar defining features as those who had, originally, appeared to threaten their very existence, were by their very essence ‘threatening’. I would argue that it is not the person of colour who is perceived as the ‘threat’, because the person remains ‘unknown/hidden’ those who would discriminate against him/her, rather, it is the meaning inherent in the very skin in which the person of colour is embodied that seems to offend, and to which all hostility is, now, being directed (De Maynard, 1999).

Heidegger, and Sartre highlighted the importance of ‘relation’ in the ‘lived-world’, to emphasise ‘how’ experience might influence our understanding of ourselves. It is argued that there is no such thing as the ‘self’ without saying something about ‘how’ the ‘Self’ is relational to a ‘lived-world’. ‘Self’ cannot exist in isolation of the ‘lived-world’, and to describe ‘Self’ in this way appears to be “nonsensical”. For instance, if I describe myself as being ‘warm, kind, and generous, etc.’, such adjectives seem to remain devoid of meaning without my saying something about the context(s) in which these forms of self-expression may be shown, and those with whom these forms of self-expression were shared. It could be argued that such words have a common ‘meaning’, and that such ‘meaning’ is shared within an English speaking population. But without stating the context in which these words are to be located, and saying something about ‘how’ these words may be related to the different component within any given event/situation, these words remain ‘meaningless’. The impression given is one “of not being-in-the-world”, and/or ‘objectifying relationship with others’. My description is transformed further, if, I then say something about that within which I am embodied, (i.e. my physical sense of self). Hence the symbol, (i.e. object or person), seems to be, always, representative of a ‘fraction’ that which is signified, and never truly representative of the whole object, or person.

Where we sense the ‘lived-world’ through experience, we get a dialectical view of our own body in relation to that ‘lived-world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p188). We perceive the ‘live-world’ as something that exists, externally, to ourselves but fail to realise that our perceptions are of our own making/creation. Often “worldviews made”, appear/believed to be “worldviews shared”, when in reality our worldviews this may be more reflective of the difference in world experience on an individual level. The experience of discrimination in people of colour may not be a shared experience in some areas of the world when people of colour are in the majority. We seem to come to understand how others relate to us, though we may not fully understand how ‘we’ relate to others. This may remain ‘hidden’, and seem at the outset, inconsequential. We derive an essence of ‘self’ in relation to the ‘Leibwelt’ that seems to be ‘dynamic’, and constantly subject to change, and re-evaluation (Van der Velde, 1985). But it may be argued that there are some aspects of ‘self’ that seem to remain ‘fixed’, and ‘unchangeable’; irrespective of changes in time, and space. These aspects are, usually, those components of our embodiment that some people use to invoke negative configurations of thought, and feeling, which when ‘acted-out’ become experienced as discrimination, (e.g. gender, sexual orientation, skin colour, etc.,). This point may be illustrated within the context of the following case study.

Case Study:

The client was a 37yrs old, unemployed, Black man who lived alone. He presented with issues/concerns that seemed to be related to a difference in perception between him self, and others. In other words, the client saw himself as one person, but was aware that others do not behave in a way that is reflexive of ‘how’ he had perceived himself to be. He often found himself reacting to others in ways, which not only seemed to reinforce/confirm his own beliefs, but also seemed to reinforce and confirm their prejudices, (e.g. critical, pedantic and sarcastic). This behaviour he said was completely out of character for him, and conflicted with the perception he had held of himself, (i.e. as opposed to pleasant warm and generous).

We began by using the identifying activating events/situations, concomitant thoughts, feeling, and resultant behaviour, and measuring to what extent his interpretation/perception of the event was valid. Separating-out ‘activating events’, from concomitant thought, feeling, and subsequent action, gave us opportunity to identify the ‘psychological facts’ pertaining to these specific events/situations (Sartre, 1956). It was then possible to show the ‘relatedness’ between all the ‘psychological facts’ without there being too much of a difference in interpretation between that which the client believed to be ‘a true reflection of experience’, and that which the counsellor/therapist which believed to be ‘true’. We were then able to consider the possibility that the client's perceptions were ‘true’, and accept that in the absence of viable alternative descriptive accounts that would challenge his perception, it would be reasonable to accept his perception of events/situations as being ‘valid’. Unconditional acceptance of the client’s material grew over time, as variation in his recounts began to subside.

In this scenario, alternative ways of looking at things then became pointless; even irrelevant; as the client had shown that he had been treated, differently; derogatively; in his everyday life. An evaluation using descriptive, existential and conceptual analysis, and logical argument had shown that he had not been deceiving himself. Even where the client had appeared to the counsellor to be exercising ‘bad-faith’, the counsellor has no evidence to the contrary as he was not present in the given situations at any given time. So, having arrived at a ‘time-space continuum’ where the client’s beliefs had been outlined, and a ‘sedimentation’ had be identified, it was then possible to identify key features of his behaviour: to derive an underlying structure inherent in his experience (Sternberg, 1977; Brown and Clement, 1989). It was possible to not only show how the client, often, ‘externalised blame’, (i.e. deny personal responsibility for his actions), thus ensuring that the problem, (i.e. the source of his emotional distress), existed external to self, (i.e. with those with whom he had interacted, socially), but it was, also, possible show how he had often ‘personalised’ his experience such that the problem would then be located within himself. This seemed to relate some aspect of his person with his experience of depression, and the tendency to ‘distance’ himself from everyday interaction. It transpired that this aspect of his person was an aspect of his embodiment: his skin colour.

Hence, he would point out irrefutable ‘physical facts’ about his person that he believed had resulted in his experience of ridicule, (i.e. the colour of skin, the language he used, of the tone of his voice). Initially, he blamed others for this ridicule, and argued that it was ‘the accused’ that had ridiculed him. The existence of such ‘physical facts’; it is argued; seemed to precipitate a social response which he found difficult to accept; and from which there was no escape/avoidance. But, what of his perception of ‘being-with-the-world’? Could it then argued that the way he perceives the world is ‘true’, but coping with such adversity had given rise to a ‘philosophy for living’ which made it difficult for him to remain in relation to the lived-world? The argument being if, he had responded to that which had been perceived, and in so doing, applied a philosophy for living which had been shown to reflect his emotional angst/distress: he may have, inadvertently, made sure that others continued to relate to him as an object; as merely a skin colour.

This ‘philosophy for life’ seemed representative of someone who saw perceived persecution in his everyday life as a direct threat to his very existence. He found in difficult to ‘be-with-the-world’ as he feared others would discover that, which he, actively, tried to hide, (i.e. the tone of his voice; the colour of his skin; the level of his intelligence, etc.,). This fear was realised when the demand for interaction was made explicit. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was agreed that this was the client’s social reality; his view of ‘being-in-the-world’; and, this needed to be, unconditionally, accepted as such.

The client, having experienced the counsellor’s unconditional acceptance of that which the client had believed to be true, was then able to consider the possibility that his worldview was full of ambiguity, and uncertainty. This ambiguity/uncertainty could not be avoided by “hiding aware in his flat” in the long-term; or, as the client had put it ‘hibernating’. The client had been diagnosed as being clinically depressed, and had been prescribed anti-depressants for this by his G.P. However, in accepting his point of view, the counsellor was given the opportunity to address the issue of personal responsibility for his own behaviour during our psychotherapeutic encounters. It was agued that the thoughts and feelings he had been experiencing were of his own making: they were created out of the Existential angst he had experienced being in relation to ‘being-in-the-lived-world’. He had not shown that such interpretation of experience had been ‘provoked’ by some external force, (e.g. the person with whom he had taken issue), inherent in his ‘lived-world’, but it could be shown that created out of the information to which he had, selectively, attended within his own mind. The client was encouraged to take responsibility for his behaviour, (i.e. his thoughts, feelings, and actions), by considering the possibility that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he had not shown that he had been “under the influence of some external force”.

It would seem that following the perception of that which appeared to threaten his very existence; the client, had made comparisons between ‘how’ he perceived himself, and ‘how’ he believed he had been perceived by others. When the resultant ‘angst’ had precipitated within his own mind, he had concluded that others were not only treating him, differently, but that they were doing so in relation to some aspect of his person about which he could do, nothing. For him, other’s behaviour signified discrimination; for whatever reason, others seemed to dislike some aspect of his being, and wished to distance themselves from it. This was illustrated by the client pointing out how others had ‘frowned at him’; how they had ‘crossed the road when they saw him approaching’; ‘how they had mocked and ridiculed the way he spoke/acted’, or how they had ‘cast aspersions at his sexual orientation’.

These experiences when personalised, seemed to take on ‘a life of their own’. As if seeing the world through a veil of a particular hue, the world became transformed into a place that seemed to threaten his very existence. His attempts to hide; to hibernate as he had put it; had all failed. In the end, the client continued to be confronted with his own existence, with the finiteness of life, with the freedom to exist or not exist, with his own meaninglessness, and his own isolation, irrespective of whether he chose to engage the world; or not. He was faced with the choice of either holding on to a view of being in a ‘lived-world’ in which had been transformed into a place where he had experienced a “sense of decreased self-worth/value”, and giving up this view that other’s derogatory behaviour ‘caused’ this transformation into “decreased self worth”. Or challenging these beliefs on the basis that they were his own thoughts and feelings, and that they symbolised, and showed significance to, that which he himself had perceived, and believed to be ‘true’. He was the asked to consider the extent he would then be able to influence the thoughts and feelings, and explore ways in which others had, ‘magically’, influenced his thought and feeling.

This point was illustrated by considering now the concept of perception that differs, overtime, and between individuals and groupings within society (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1963; Van der Welde, 1985). He was asked to identify aspects inherent in his perception of ‘self’, and make comparisons with that which may have been perceived in others. He was, also, asked to show to what extent his perceptions were ‘true reflections of that which had been experienced’, overtime. It was found that his perception of others not only changed from one minute to the next, but in relation, his perception of others seemed to pay most attention to that which different.

Such differences may go unnoticed such as “when a friend has anew ‘hair-cut’, or “is wearing a new ‘out-fit’, but he will almost certainly noticed those aspects of others that hold some special significance for him. Wertz (1982) argued that such significance is, often, goal orientated. Hence, the client is aware differences in facial expression, tone of voice, the language used, and the content of that which is spoken, in situations where the purpose of interaction demands an exchange of verbal intent. Such differences may hold special significance for him in these circumstances, and he may be more likely to become aware of such differences.

Further, it was found that the reasons given for a ‘difference in perception’ were, often difficult to validate, (i.e. there was not enough evidence to support claims which contradicted the client's perception of self), as the same evidence could to explain some other aspect inherent within a given time-space continuum, (e.g. a shop assistance awareness of the absence of a smile on his face, for instance). However, it was accepted that in relation to others, the client had assumed that others were behaving in response to his presence, therefore although his arguments were not good-enough in some situations, they were reasonable in others, (e.g. in exchanges that occurred in shops). It was maintained that the client had not ‘tested-out’ his hypotheses at the time by asking the pertinent/direct question), and was therefore unable to make the sought of claims that he was making despite his indignation.

It was, also, possible to show how the client had, often, seemed to respond to perceived discrimination, or perceived ‘threat’ in ways, which could have reinforced any derogatory beliefs/attitudes/values others may have held with reference to some aspect of the client’s person. This could serve to validate, compliment, and maintain a personal philosophy for life based on what appeared to be a ‘difference in perception’, overtime.

By identifying that which was ‘different’ in his response, it was possible to then say something about the essence of that which was perceived. In becoming aware of the subject matter, he had tacitly, looked for images that he understood to mean welcoming gestures and a desire to relate. In the absence of such welcoming gestures, his attention became ‘fixed’ on that which could be said to challenge the perception he had held of himself. Pre-reflection seemed to compromised of perception that seemed inappropriate, or bared little relation to the task undertaken. For instance, the client’s interaction with a shop assistant seemed to conflict with the client’s view of that which he believed to be good customer service’. Out of the angst that materialised within his own mind, the client created a sense of anger, and resentment, which was reflected in his subsequent behaviour, (i.e. a sarcastic and pedantic attitude). Already, the client seemed to have invoked an emotion of anger in response to experienced angst. It was, therefore, argued that once the client had become aware of deference reflected in the behaviour of others in his lived-world, the tension that arose was transformed into something that was more reflective of perception others had him in the lived-world. It was if he was, inadvertently, mimicking others perception of him in their ‘lived-world’. He had given himself over to the ‘imagined’ influence of others, and renounced all responsibility for his own behaviour.

As the therapist, I put it to him that if his response his lived-world conflicted with any ideation he may have had of himself, then he could be accused on behaving, inauthentically. It was as if he, himself, had become inauthentic in the presence of those he perceived to be challenging his right to be in that time-space continuum. Further, it was argued that he could not plead innocence in such situations where his response to the awareness of deference in perception had resulted in the perpetuation of ‘perceived threat’.

After much deliberation, both in, and out, of encounter it was then possible to plan a course of interaction that would challenge others perception of the client, rather reinforce it. Primary formulations included the view that there was something, identifiably, different in way he was in the world; perhaps, the way he had behaved towards others; that elicited a form of behaviour in others, which then perpetuated the internal conflict he had experienced in relation to being-in-the-lived-world. It was agreed that there were aspects of his person; the very nature of his embodiment; that had been perceived in negative way, and that his realisation of these points of deference had developed into an internal tensions culminating in the experience of Existential angst (doubt). Through, a process of transformation, the client had created an emotion that reflected his reluctance to accept the perceived views/opinions of others. This emotion, anger, only conveyed his displeasure but reinforced others perception of the client. Through this veil of anger (Sartre, 1956), the client viewed his lived-world and attempted to distance himself from it, whilst at the same demand that the lived-world give-up that which the client desired. It was the client’s own evaluation of Self that seemed to be challenged, and in transformation he had ensured that others in his lived-world continued to challenge his self-perception.

The client, thought and pondered view, on this for some time, but eventually, the client’s denial of the existence of such contributing behaviour/aspect of being, and hence apparent difficulty accepting responsibility for such behaviour, became less pronounced. His apparent attempts to engage in ‘wish fulfilment’; to conduct ‘magic’; seemed to ensure that his experience of being in relation in his lived-world continue to be full of angst. His efforts to avoid such experience by ‘hibernating’; cutting himself off from the lived-world had proven, pointless. It seemed pointless because the internal dialectical debate remained inconclusive. The dilemma seemed to precipitate into a perception of the world as threatening his very existence. In the absence of new/different information he seemed “trapped”.

Unconditional acceptance of the probability that others had treated him with deference was acknowledge, but to accuse others on the basis of something that he had created in himself seemed, unhelpful, and open to dispute. This probability was reflected in the client’s recount of scenes events, and situations in which he experienced Existential angst were explored with aim of analysing the descriptions given, and eliciting a ‘confession’ that would be reflexive of that experience. It was found on reflection that he did play a role in maintaining the level of angst that he had experienced, and that he had not been wholly honest/authentic when recounting such events/situations, previously. In acknowledgment of the importance of information provided by that within which he was embodied, we concluded that he had derived a reasonable conclusion by being in relation to his ‘lived-world’, but he was till required to take a ‘leap of faith’ into another form of uncertainty where the very skin he was born in was not an issue.

This the client found difficult to accept, but in the face of the ‘evidence’, he was obliged to consider the possibility that he could not avoid/escape from the taking responsibility for the anger he invoked, nor for his resultant behaviour within the recounted situations. He had given detailed accounts of situations in which he had experienced discrimination, (e.g. at shops, the job centre, at the sports centre, at bars, pubs, etc.,), and came to the conclusion that such experiences could not be avoided, not could he escape form them. Others will, always, seem to be making assumptions about the meaning inherent in that within which we are embodied, but whether he chose to facilitate others adherence to such beliefs wherein others assumptions are validated was entirely up to him.

Out of his uncertainty; his doubt; he may need to consider taking that ‘leap of faith’ into another place of uncertainty where the responses of others to his very presence could not be predetermined. This seemed to be the task to meaningful experience of being in the ‘lived-world’; not least of all because it required the client to step into the unknown, and to embrace uncertainty. However, as the client had come to accept that his current ways of being in the lived world, (i.e. based on assumptions that he was not prepared to validate one way or the other), he accepted this view as being implicit of the choices/options that were open to him. He accepted that he could not control the way others responded to him when they first came into contact with him, but he could influence the ways in which he was in relation to them by being aware of his own angst, and ‘doing’ something which contradicts/challenges others expectations.

To retain authenticity, the client agreed to attempt to present himself in ways, which would allow the others to confront him with a perception of himself as he may appear to others. It was posited that inherent in the ‘role’ he had assumed in his ‘lived-world, social interaction was fused with behaviour that was reflexive of his own frustration. By ‘externalising blame’ for that which resulted from his own deliberations ensured that the angst he experienced was reproduced, and perpetuated, overtime. It was, also, posited that he could not expect others to share his worldview, and illustrated this point by demonstrating how different my worldview was from his. Further, he could not hope to influence the behaviour of others without their willingness to be influenced. This might be more difficult where he actively pursued a way of life that limited the possibility of ‘good-enough’ social interaction.

An awareness of inner conflict, tension/frustration within himself in relation to ‘real or imagined perceived threat’ would prompt the initiation of the new/different behaviour in his everyday life. It was admitted that he might be tempted to resume old ways or relating in the lived-world, and to communicate his thoughts/feelings in subsequent behaviour, negatively, but that he, already, knew that this had not resolved the emotional distress he might have felt, and that he might best transform such experience into something that facilitates, if not maintains the possibility of, ‘authentically, being-with-the-world’.

Overtime, the counsellee was able to present a perception of ‘self’ that was more reflexive of ‘how’ he perceived himself to be, rather than respond to that which he perceived, negatively, in others. This was indicated in homework set that illustrated his ability to consider alternative ways of ‘being-in-the-world’, and hence chose how best he might be in-relation to his ‘lived-world’.

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