Philosophical Counselling: A
Critical Evaluation.
In this essay, I would, like to present a critical
evaluation of Philosophical Counselling as I understand it, to show points of
contention, (e.g. the paradox of self-deception, the importance of perception),
and then show how such points of contention could jeopardise the counselling
encounter; if, not the counselling process.
This might best be illustrated a presentation of a case from my current
client work.
Philosophical counselling; it is argued; aims to
derive ‘self-reflective knowledge’ that is ‘client-led’ (Jopling, 1996; Paden,
1998). It is assumed that this ‘self-reflective knowledge/understanding’ is a
valid account of ‘how’ an individual in relation to the ‘lived-world’, and as
such may be used as a means to client self-development, or to the derivation of
practical solutions to the client’s everyday problems.
Few writers seem to be able to specify what
philosophical counselling actually ‘is’, but many writers have given some
indication as to what it ‘does’; its aims and objectives. For instance, Jopling
(1996) suggests that philosophical counselling ‘helps clients to achieve an
‘accurate, defensible, action-guided and truth-orientated self-understanding’.
Indeed, Paden (1998) refers to the derivation of self-reflective knowledge
which implies that where the tools of philosophical investigation are used in
the process of counselling, (i.e. detailed description, conceptual and
Existential analysis, and logical argument), the counsellor may be seen to be
facilitating the acquisition of
‘philosophical insight’ in those seeking help and support, and presented
possible methods of client-led deliberation, it may be claimed that the ‘work
of philosophical counselling’ has been achieved.
Such insights are not considered to be valuable,
intrinsically, in the same way as they might be in traditional philosophy; nor
even therapeutic where correlations are made between the ‘normative’ definition
of therapy and philosophical counselling are made; but, they do seem to be
reflexive of self-knowledge that might be useful in the process of
decision-making, or problem-solving. Further the philosophical counsellor does
not seem to be engaged in a process, which is illustrative of the treatment of
a presenting ‘mental illness’. The
counsellor seems to be engaged in process which will, hopefully, determine
‘how’ a person has come to be in relation to his/her ‘lived-world’, and to
facilitate a process of change under the direction of the client (Paden, 1998).
In this sense philosophical counselling is, arguably, ‘client-centred’, and the
counsellor, merely, facilitates this process of identifying and evaluating the
authenticity of the counsellee’s philosophy of life.
Philosophical counselling seems to rely on the presentation, or even interpretation, of practical everyday concerns/issues/problems in a philosophical way, and seems to rely on a propensity towards abstract thought. Questions such as ‘who am I’, and ‘what do I really want out of life’ (Jopling, 1996, p299), are not questions to which most of my clients to date, readily, allude. Indeed, clients are more likely to describe themselves in terms of ‘what they do’, and ‘what effect does that have on me’, rather than ‘how I am in relation to aspects of their lived-world’. Similarly, client’s seem to be better able to in what way they perceive themselves to be are ‘a father, a mother, an employee’, etc, and convey this with less difficulty, than give information that communicates the extent to which they might be ‘warm, generous, kind, benevolent, etc,’. The client’s propensity to objectify the relationship with others in our ‘lived- world’ seems to be reflected in the quality of discourse that describes others in their everyday lives to a greater or lesser degree, and seems to facilitate the process of individuation — the ‘separating-out’ of self, from others. It is argued that there is a disparity within self-perception. That we, as individuals perceive ourselves as ‘being-one-way-in-the-world’, and at the same time invoke a number of others ways of ‘being-in-the-world’, equally of their our own making, but said to be representative of how the client is perceived by others.
Buber (1923 (trans. 1970)) distinguishes between the ‘I-it’ way of being relational, and the ‘I-thou’, way of being relational, and suggests that we often objectify ourselves in-relation to other aspects of our ‘lived-world’. Others such Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre might argue that we are in the ‘process of being’, and these ways of being in relation with the ‘lived-world’ is representative of a ‘developmental process’. We will, eventually, develop the ‘courage to be‘ Tillich, 1952) in relation with the ‘lived-world’ that is more subjective; perhaps even, develop ways of being-in-relation that transcends the ‘lived-world’ (Binswanger, 1962). However, it could be argued that these four different ways of being in relation to the lived-world, (.i.e. Umwelt, Mitwelt, Einwelt, Uberwelt) are “useful” depending on the circumstances in which we find ourselves— ‘our throwness’. They provide a means by which the individual; having been made aware of the nature of his/her very existence through that within which we are embodied (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; 1963; 1968), can remain ‘in-relation’, and yet seem ‘not in-relation’, all at the same time. We can present an ‘essence’ of the ourselves to the world that may be either wholly, or partially complete depending on the extent to which our senses tell us that it is “safe” to so do. It this way, we develop belief/value systems which may be representative of the extent to which we a ‘free’ to ‘be-in-the-lived-world’. Indeed, Jopling (1996) makes the distinction between the ‘actual full self’, and the 'perceived self’, but this does not give any indication as to how we might differentiate between ‘how we might perceive ourselves’, and ‘how we might be perceived by others’. The ‘perceived-self’ seems to show both ‘duality’, and difference, and yet may not be indicative of ‘who’ we are as individuals. How is this possible?
There remains an
inherent difference between the ways the client is relational during the
therapeutic encounter, and who that client perceives his/herself to be in
relation to others in their ‘lived-world’. Jopling (1996) makes the distinction
by referring to the ‘actual full self’, and the 'perceived self’. But this does
not allow for the difference between ‘how we perceive ourselves’, and ‘how we
are perceived by others’. It is argued that the ‘perceived self’ shows both
‘duality’, and ‘difference’, and yet may not be indicative of ‘who’ we, truly,
are as individuals in our everyday lives. If, we are in relation as objects
then the essence of identity becomes reflective of a ‘lived-world’ that is
selective in its demands, and in so doing dictates which part of us that is
required to show expression, and which part of us that is required to remain
‘hidden’. This reflects a “things done
unto us” sought of attitude, and responsibility for our own behaviour is firmly
located externally to ourselves. We are not required to express ourselves using
language which would be suggestive of ‘who they are’ as individuals, and
society demands that we show the ways we are relational by behaving in ways,
which are indicative of belonging to a social grouping, (e.g. family, club,
etc.,). Kierkegaard’s ‘herd mentality’ seems to reign supreme when discussing
in what ways we are relational to the ‘lived-world’. Beyond what they ‘do’ as a
member of a social grouping seems to become lost in a milieu of personal
invocations that world be indicative of a mechanistic view to social existence.
In observation, we seem to be required to make a
number of assumptions about others based on what others may be observed
‘doing’, ‘having done’, or being ‘done at some point in the future’, without
due consideration of the effect our presence may be having on the others
recount of their experience. The importance of context, and saying something
about how thought and feeling are relational, also needs to be addressed, if,
only to add ‘meaning’ to described experience. Sartre (1943) argues that
‘psychological facts’, such as thought and feeling, are meaningless with saying
something about the context in which this ‘psychological facts are located;
and, in which ways the said thoughts and feelings are relation to the
‘lived-world’ (Sartre, 1943). This detracts from any possibility of ever
deriving an interpretation of ‘being-in-the-world’ that would be indicative of
what it might be like existing in the world as an individual; as a ‘person’,
and not as an ‘object’.
Further, any
correlation between the ‘person specific facts’ relating personhood to their
lived world cannot be made, in the absence of communication, which illustrates
personhood to the ‘lived-world’. So, for instance, the meaning inherent in skin
colour may only be derived from a contextual and descriptive analysis of the
information provided by the client during the therapeutic encounter, which
shows in which ways they are relational to their ‘lived-world’. Where such
information shows the client view of world to be indicative of someone who
experiences others as ‘objectifiers’, the listener can but conclude that the
person has been reduced to a ‘skin colour’ in his own mind, and all traces of
their ‘personhood’ has been lost in relation to his ‘lived-world’. So for
instance, the client who experiences discrimination in relation to his skin
colour, has effectively, been reduced to a skin colour in his/her own mind, and
all traces of his personhood have been lost in that process. The counsellor
must guard against self-delusion during the therapeutic encounter; especially
where the person with whom they are in relation appears to be a ‘self-confessed
skin colour object’.
Clearly, on reflection this is not a whole truth. The
client having showed in which ways s/he might be relational to ‘lived-world’,
seems unaware of his/her propensity to objectify self and others such that his
true self has become ‘hidden’. It could even be argued that any configuration
that would be reflective of a true self has become transformed into this
“thing” which seems to be little more than a skin colour (De Maynard, 1999). In
describing ourselves as ‘role-takers’, and in saying something about how we
have been objectified. We, inadvertently, give that which could only be a
partial description of that which is being perceived/observed. Finding out an
individual’s existential concerns, beliefs, values, attitudes, opinions, etc.,
placing them in real life contexts, and showing their relation in these
contexts, could well present an opportunity to provide a more complete
perception of that which is believed to be true, and ultimately relies on the
skilful application of philosophical questions which would be best asked of the
client themselves. But as mentioned above, many clients do not seem to question
themselves, philosophically, and deriving meaning from information which is
indicative of an objectified means of relating may only present an opportunity
for a difference of perception to arise.
Jopling (1996) argues that ‘who we are’; is to some degree; unknown to use, and even that as individuals we deceive, mistake, and/or ignore aspects of ourselves when determining through reasoned argument ‘who we are’. The assumption being that philosophical counselling aims to validate self-statements by an evaluation of ‘evidence’ presented during the session(s) (Thompson, 1996). However, it could be argued that given a person’s self-knowledge/under-standing at any given time/place, ‘self-deception’ (Guttenplan, 1994), and ‘self-misrepresentation’ could be construed as a ‘figment of the imagination’ as it does not seem, logically, possible to deceive oneself. Consider; for a moment; that if, an individual knows that s/he is deceiving themselves they can not be judged to be deceiving themselves because they know that they are deceiving themselves. The converse must the, also, be true. If, a person does not know that they are deceiving themselves they cannot be deceiving themselves because they know no different. However, it may be possible following an evaluation of evidence/information communicated during the therapeutic encounter, for the therapist to arrive at a conclusion which makes; either explicitly, or implicitly; known to the client that the counsellor believes that the client is deceiving themselves. How well the client tolerates the emotional distress that may originate as a result of his/her beliefs following this announcement will, ultimately, be reflexive of the quality of the ‘working alliance’, and the meaning they might attribute to the presentation of alternative viewpoints.
One of the primary assumptions that seem to determine
whether or not a client becomes engaged is that s/he is determined to get to
the ‘personal truth’ underpinning his/her behaviour. It is an assumption
because the client may believe that the philosophy underpinning their
interaction with the lived-world was, and is based on, information that s/he
may well believe to be; or have been; true. Further, that which seems
‘truthful’ to the client, may not seem ‘truthful’ to the counsellor. The
counsellor seems bent on identifying the ‘confession’; that which acknowledges
the counsellee’s weaknesses/vulnerabilities; and, like a doctor demanding that
the client ‘reveals his/her wounds’, indirectly beckons the counsellee to
‘speak out and hide it not within’ (Watts, 1969, p43). Boethius’ writes:
‘Whoever deeply searches out
the truth,
And will not be deceived by
paths untrue,
Shall turn unto himself his
inward gaze,
Shall bring wandering
thoughts in circle’ (Watts, 1969, p113)
as that which is sort; the
solution to all that is emotionally distressing is believed to lie within the
individual, and not external to ‘self’. It is therefore argued that the
counsellee who refuses to accept responsibility for his/her own behaviour; who
refuses to reach that all-illusive ‘confession’; and, who refuses to ‘recover
that which has been lost within themselves’; may need to referred, elsewhere
(Jopling, 1996).
Points of Contention:
Firstly, as none as us may be shown to exist in a
social vacuum, it may be argued that philosophical counselling does not occur
in a social vacuum! The counsellor,
too, will have views, and opinions, which will inform his/he behaviour. To
assume complete objectivity is not realistic. Indeed, the ability to maintain
‘philosophical scepticism' in reference to everything that considers itself to
be ‘beyond doubt’ requires a certain amount of individuality on the part of the
counsellor. His/her knowledge of events/situations, life experience may be
considered to be ‘instrumental’ in arriving at points about which questions may
then be asked. However, this in itself presents a paradox. The paradox arises
as a consequence of two conflicting demands, (i.e. (a) to remain
non-judgmental; and, (b) to philosophically question), are made on the part of
the counsellor. It is assumed that the counsellor cannot avoid showing the
extent to which s/he is in relation to his/her lived-world during the
Philosophical encounter. It seems
impossible for the counsellor to refrain from making some value judgment about
that which is communicated, and remain human at the same time.
Secondly, Paden (1998) argues that modern philosophers
‘study, and teach a particular kind of reflective knowledge’ (ibid, p8). This
suggests that the client/student is likely to be presented with a different
quantity and quality of reflective knowledge depending on which philosophical
counsellor s/he seeks help and support. Although, Paden argues that the
philosophical counsellors are not teachers, per se, the temptation to present a
different world view; which may be more reflexive of the counsellor’s world
view; remains very strong. Similarly, there is an equally, strong possibility
that the counsellor’s view of that which may be considered to be ‘sound
judgment/reasoning, accurate description, and clear thinking’ may be imposed on
the unsuspecting client. This could have deleterious effect on the counselling
process, especially, where the counsellor is unaware of his/her propensity to
dispense of his/her wisdom (Jopling, 1996; Van Deurzen-Smith, 1999). However,
the tools used for philosophical debate, (i.e. detailed description, conceptual
and existential analysis, and logical argument), are considered valuable
assets/commodities for the philosophical counsellor.
Lastly, philosophical counselling seems to,
vehemently, defend the view that it is a ‘non-scientific’ approach (Paden,
1998, p12). That is it does not attempt to derive hypotheses, and set about
determining to what extent they may true, representative, non-reactive, and
hence generalisable. But it could be
argued that although specific to the individual, the philosophical counsellor
does seek to isolate a self-reflective knowledge and understanding that is
‘theoretical’ in its structure, and applied to aspects of the counsellee’s
daily life as, and when, the circumstances permit. It becomes possible to
assume that in a given set of circumstances, and under stated conditions, the
counsellee is more likely; than at other times; to behave in a particular way.
Thought; like feeling, and action; may be considered to be forms of behaviour,
and as such identifiable within a given philosophical statement on ‘self’.
Hence, a philosophical statement not only offers an description of the way an
individual shows relation to their ‘lived-world’, it also offers an explanation
for an individual’s behaviour under stated conditions, and as such may offer an
opportunity for reasonable prediction is as much as people may be judged to
tend towards ‘”the habitual”.
Attention is drawn to the view that this approach
would be most useful to those who ‘think’, philosophically, (i.e. self-reflectively),
as opposed to those who take a much more
‘action-focused’ approach to life, (i.e. reflexive of behaviour in
groups), as this important distinction
enables the assessor to determine which aspects of a particular therapeutic
approach would be most suitable for helping and supporting the client. For
example, in my own practise, I have found that a detailed analysis of presented
information may be accepted, unconditionally, and not challenged without
firstly securing a “good-enough relationship” with the client, and secondly
ensuring that the client is “supported enough”, to accept any scepticism that
s/he may perceive to be undermining his/her world view.
This quality of relationship within the Philosophical
encounter may be further improved by the use of what Bruner (1975) referred to
as ‘scaffolding’. He argued for an evaluation of the individual, which would be
representative to the need for a form of “psychological support” which, goes
beyond the normative forms of support usually undertaken during the therapeutic
process. In the same way as ‘scaffolding’ supports a building, ‘psychological
scaffolding’ may be shown to support the child as s/he grows, and develops
his/her use of language. It is not suggested that the client is in any way ‘childish’,
but the idea of determining the extent to which metaphorical scaffolding as a
relational tool may be beneficial may ensure that the client remains engaged
throughout any philosophical debate, which proves ‘difficult’. This may be,
particularly, important for the more vulnerable members of society; those who
show a particular disposition for experiencing real or imagined, ‘ perceived
threat’. For example, those who may feel disaffected, and/or dejected (e.g. the
homeless).
An Application:
My work with people of colour may illustrate this
point more, succinctly. A young Black man (37) who presents feeling depressed.
His depression, he says, is related to his desire to pursue a particular career
and not being able to due to cash-flow problems. Cash flow, severely, limits
the life choices he is able to make, the social situations he is likely to find
himself in, and the ultimately his general sense of health and well-being. In
demonstrating just ‘how’ limited he describes ‘not being able to get out of bed
in the morning, or not doing the shopping, or not feeling able to go out to
seek work; not because he is feeling depressed but because he does not have the
money to do so.
At the first
instance, the G.P. may evaluate his symptoms, and arrived at the conclusion
that the client is depressed, and prescribe a course of antidepressants. The
G.P. has assumed that the client is depressed due to some chemical imbalance in
the client’s brain, and seeks to redress this imbalance by the administration
of antidepressants. This seems like a very good decision, (i.e. based on
reasoned argument and supported by scientific evidence. But it could be argued that no amount of
antidepressants is going to put food on the table, nor provide a “good-enough
reason” for engaging in daily life other that experienced by the client in that
place, and at that time! Schick (1997) might argue that the ‘resultant action’
was only, partially, indicative of the ‘cause’, and that the G.P. had not
considered all the possible reasons of the ‘chemical imbalance’ having arisen
in the first place, (i.e. real or imagined social implications). It might even
be argued that this decision is not a very good decision because the G.P. had
not considered all the information that could have been provided by the client
(Davidson, 1982)
Now, the client’s worldview was that ‘the type of
work he can find; and consequently, the amount of money he could earn was
related to others views about the meaning inherent within/attributable to the
colour of his skin. He argued that ‘evidence’ reflected in any evaluation of
his everyday social interaction with others supports, and reinforces, the view
that those with the power to improve his life chances discriminate against him
purely on the basis of the colour of skin. He argued that as they do not ‘know
him as a person’, nor are others ‘familiar with the way he is in relation’, he
must conclude that ‘others discriminate against him based on some aspect of his
physical being. This physical attribute or ‘defining feature’, he concludes,
‘must be his skin colouration’. He recounted situations in which others had
assumed that he was 'up to no-good’ simply by their reasoning that he was in a
certain place, at a certain time, when he had not specified his reasoning for
being in that place at that time, (e.g. example stood ‘on a street corner’, or
‘in shop door way’). He said he felt ‘he needed to explain himself, unduly’,
where others; who do not share his defining features; do not (De Maynard,
1999). The client likened this experience to ‘feeling almost as if he needed
others’ permission to be in that place, at that time’.
Philosophically, we had arrived at a ‘narrative’ that
depicted the client’s worldview, however, any attempt to present an alternative
worldview, or to dispute anything that the client had said could not be
undertaken in the absence of new/different information to the contrary. Any
attempt to determine whether or not the client’s world view was indicative of a
‘distorted sense of self’, ‘weakness of will’, ‘self-deception’, or ‘poor reasoning’, for instance, could not be
ascertained until the client-therapist relationship was perceived to be
‘good-enough’ to allow for such deliberations. My reasoning here, is based on
the experience of ‘expressed rage’ when the client’s own interpretations of
events/situations into which the client had been ‘thrown’ were challenged. The
client made reference to the possibility that the counsellor had been
inattentive, and consequently, accused the counsellor of ‘not listening’; or, ‘failing to believe
him’. The client was, also, more inclined to sustain, and perpetuate, his
worldview; more vigorously, and decline any attempt to alter his perception of
the world, and his place in it. Thus, any attempt to, philosophically,
question, and thus ascertain the ‘philosophical truth’ was denied.
After due consideration, it appeared that the
counsellor is at risk of experiencing internal tension/frustration as s/he
attempted to resolve points of conflict between the client’s viewpoint, and
that of his/her own. The frustration, and Existential angst experienced by the
counsellor are remained his/her own making, and as such may bore little
relation to the counsellee’s own existential concerns. The counsellor was the
required to consider ‘how’ the client was in relation to his ‘lived-world’, and
remember that he was not privy to the ‘all’ the client’s self-reflective
knowledge. This may have best been achieved by a consolation of the client’s
philosophy for life, in isolation of the client.
Let us consider the possibility that the counsellor
may have been deceiving himself. Such deceit could have been based on the
belief that it is possible to distinguish between a ‘prima facie 'judgment, and
an ‘all-things-considered’ judgment (Davidson, 1982). This seems reasonably
plausible, if, it can be shown that is a difference between the sum total of
all the information made available to the client, and that which is recounted
during the therapeutic encounter. As the information subjected to evaluation
when making an ‘all-things-considered’ judgment had not been shown to be
different in the client’s own mind, any ‘all-things considered’ judgement would
show no significant difference to a ‘prima facie’ judgement. However, during the counselling encounter,
the counsellor brought to bare any information he might have had in relation to
experienced discrimination in similar situations/events in which he had found himself.
Such information, implicitly, outlined his belief in
the pre-existence of discriminatory beliefs in others, and he refused to accept
any proposal of alternative worldviews; contrived or otherwise. There then arises a dilemma; a state of
confusion; within the mind of the client. He believed that his interpretation
of events was correct, and as the counsellor was not present at the time the
client argued that the counsellor was not in a position to comment on that,
which had transpired. The encounter becomes ‘transformed’ in the mind of the
client, and he appeared to attempt to deny himself the experience of
Existential angst. But this was not true. In fact, the angst that he experience
invoke the Existential rage that followed, and by complaining that the
counsellor did not believe him (i.e. externalising blame), and discontinuing
the therapeutic encounter; at least for that session; he successfully managed
to limit the experience of that existential uncertainty.
Hence, it may be possible to argue that the client’s
worldview is similar to an ‘all-things-considered’. Anomalies may arise as the
individual organises information to suit his/her worldview, and this may be
different from a worldview that is not reflexive of that to which might be,
selectively, attended to by others. However, where the individual has
considered all known facts pertaining to a particular event/situation, and
arrived at a conclusion that is reflective of his/her knowledge at that time,
it is not possible to show that that conclusion is, significantly, different
from any ‘prima facie’ judgement he had made. Therefore, that individual cannot
be deceiving her/himself. S/he may appear to be deceiving him/herself
from an external point of view, but to themselves they remain truthful. As far
as they are concerned they believe that they have considered all known facts
pertaining to the event in question; proven the event problematic, and derived
a conclusion that is truly reflexive of that experience and as such cannot be
considered to be exercising ‘bad-faith’.
The client may
hold several different viewpoints in reference to any given situation/event;
all of which may be true to greater or lesser extent; without finding it
necessary to act on any of them. This would not resolve any tension/frustration
they may be experiencing until the demand for a response ‘shifts’ emotional
stability away from a point of ‘indifference’ to one of ‘concern’. The demand
for action; and, thought can be considered to be action in its own right; must
originate from within the individual. Where, society demands that s/he can be
held responsible for his/her actions, the individual must be clear as to the
very nature of their being at the particular time-space continuum if s/he is
not to be accused, wrongly. When the
quantity, and quality, of evidence used to justify one action over another
changes, it is assumed that the individual will carry out that action which has
the ‘desired effect’. Although, Schick (1997) questions the individual’s
freedom ‘to will’, and hence ‘to act’, let us consider that the possibility
that the client has ‘primacy of action’ in the absence of inescapable duress.
The individual may not be aware of the ‘desired
effect’ at the time, but on reflection s/he may be able to distinguish between
the quality and quantity of information that goes towards constructing each
resultant viewpoint. In each situation, the ‘prima facie’ judgment could be the
same as an ‘all-things-considered’ judgment in as much as the information,
(i.e. that which the cognitive psychologist might refer to as semantic and
procedural knowledge pertaining to a specific event/situation), that is
evaluated to construct that ‘prima facie’ judgment is all the information
available to the client at that time, and in that place. Therefore a ‘prima
facie’ judgment becomes an ‘all-things-considered’ judgment. This should not
detract from the possibility of the counsellor considering other factors that
may have informed the conscious decisions of the counsellor’s own life. This
would ensure that the self-reflective knowledge of the counsellor, and that of
the client, will always be different. It is very, likely, that the client may
not share the counsellor’s viewpoint; and, even take great offence to him/her
suggesting otherwise given that the counsellor was not present at the time of
the event!
To so do, would present a situation where the
client’s attempt at ascertaining the ‘truth’ would then become reflexive of the
counsellor’s own assessment of the situation; rather than the clients.
Similarly, it is assumed that the knowledge that informs the client’s viewpoint
in reference to recounted experience is the only judgment of importance at this
point. The counsellor could assume that there were other; as yet unknown;
factors which contributed to the client’s decision-making process, but as the
aim of therapy to arrive at ‘self-reflective knowledge’ informed by a
client-led evaluation of his/her experience, and as the counsellor is not privy
to the same information available to the client, any assumption to the contrary
based on a critical analysis of that which has been communicated (Thompson,
1996) seems more reflective of the counsellor’s self-reflective knowledge and
understanding. Therefore the client could not be described as expressing a
distorted sense of self, (e.g. ‘akrasia’) to any extent unless s/he themselves
concludes that that is, exactly, what s/he is, and has been doing, overtime.
A dilemma now arises. As the counsellor is unable to influence the client’s self-reflective understanding without appearing to challenge the client’s own perception of events/ situations, how does the philosophical counsellor facilitate the procurement of the true self? It seems that any advancement remains dependent on the client deriving new/different interpretations using information to which only s/he is, or has been privy. Such derivation may take an indefinite length of time, and the counselling situation open to abuse. In the meantime, the counsellor may experience frustration/tension as the possibility of a ‘confession’ (Keenan, 1998, p10) is denied to him/her, and any attempt to derive a new/different interpretation remains suppressed. If, the counsellor attempts to do anything more than clarify a client’s world view without having been given “permission” to so do by the client, s/he is at risk of forfeiting that relationship for one which is more reflective of a ‘teacher-pupil’ relationship; or adult-child relationship. If, any attempt at negotiating a new/different conclusion is made, the questions must arise as to how reflexive, and hence ‘how’ valid are such conclusions in reference to the client’s understanding of self?
Conclusion:
At best it seems that philosophical counselling is a means of deriving a reflexive knowledge and understanding of ‘self’ that is influenced by the self-reflective knowledge of the counsellor. Philosophically questioning as postulated by Lahav (1993), Jopling (1996), and Paden (1998) may serve to identify an individual’s philosophy for life. However, facilitating change may require the development of the ‘good-enough’ therapeutic relationship, and a willingness of the counsellee to accept “evidence-based criticism” of their stated philosophy for life (Hadot, 1995).
Overtime, it may become necessary to ‘construct’ a form of ‘emotional scaffolding’ that supports, and the helps, the client whilst s/he evaluates the validity of his/her worldview (Bruner, 1975). The precise quality and quantity of such ‘scaffolding’ may need to be determined through negotiation between the counsellee and counsellor, but only after the counsellor has, unconditionally, accepted that which has been communicated as being philosophically ‘true’. The cognitive psychologist may refer to this process as deriving a ‘narrative’ that not only ‘describes’ the client’s behaviour, but also helps both the therapist and client understand how the client perceives himself in relation to their ‘lived-world’. An idea of ‘how’ the client perceives him/herself in relation to others is argued to be indicative of philosophical insight, and considered useful when helping clients overcome their everyday problems/concerns. Therefore any ‘change’ that does occur during the lifetime of the therapeutic contract will be reflective of the skill, knowledge, and experience of the counsellor; and, the extent to which the counsellee is open to ‘influence’.
If, philosophical counselling involves a ‘system’ of questioning that, arguably, attempts to identify processes of moral, religious, or ethical decision-making or problem solving, and to describe and explore the process which seem to inform an individual’s behaviour, then it could be argued that those individuals who do not seem to think philosophically, may be taught how to think, philosophically, in much the same way as REBT, or CBT teaches clients how to think within the context of those approaches.
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